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I. Introduction

International law recognizes the fact that the family plays an essential and central role
in human society. The family is perceived to be “the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”1 This outlook
lies at the foundation of the broad protection granted to the family by international
law. The right to family life, which has been recognized as a fundamental right in
international law, is enunciated in all major international instruments and conventions,
and has also been the subject of a comprehensive discourse in various contexts of
Israeli law.
This article deals with the protection of the right to family life under international law
and its implementation in the State of Israel on three levels: protection of the family
cell as a single unit (the right to establish a family and, particularly, the right to
marry); protection of the individuals comprising the family unit (particularly, women
and children); and protection of the family in special circumstances (such as
immigration rights).
Israeli family law may be divided into two parts: the laws of marriage and divorce,
which are governed exclusively by religious law, on the one hand, and most other
aspects of family law (including maintenance, child custody, adoption, and
succession), which are regulated by substantive secular law, on the other hand.2 The
major inconsistencies between Israeli family law and the provisions of international
law relating to the right to family life are to be found in those areas governed by
substantive religious law. Various international conventions that were signed and
ratified by Israel mandate the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of, inter alia,
1

Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at
71 (1948) (hereinafter: “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”). Article 23(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 (hereinafter: “Covenant
on Civil Rights”), reiterates that which is stated in the Universal Declaration. See also Article 10(1) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3,
1976 (hereinafter: “Covenant on Social Rights”), which provides: “The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize that … [t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society …”. Similar treatment may be
found in Article 4 of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. res. 2542 (XXIV), 24
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969) (“A basic unit of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members, particularly children and youth”), in
Article 16 of the European Social Charter, October 18, 1961, E.T.S. 35, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, entered into
force Feb. 26, 1965 (hereinafter: “European Charter”), and in Article 22 of the Declaration on Social
Progress and Development, G.A. res. 2542 (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1969). Similar provisions may be found in various regional conventions, such as: American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth
International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992) (Article VI:
“Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection
thereof”); Article 17(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969 (“The family is
the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State”); Article 18(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981 (“The
family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take
care of its physical and moral health”).
2
See A. Rosen-Zvi, “Family and Inheritance Law,” in Introduction to the Law of Israel (A. Shapira and
K. DeWeitt-Arar, eds., 1995) at 75; P. Shifman, “Family Law in Israel: The struggle between Religious
and Secular Law”, 24 Is. L. Rev. 537, 538 (1990).
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sex, national origin, race, and religion. However, Israeli law regarding marriage and
divorce, which is discriminatory in terms of the aforesaid categories, has not been
affected by the ratification of international conventions. To a certain extent, this is
because only international customary law automatically becomes part of Israeli law,
whereas conventional international law (constitutive treaties) becomes part of Israeli
law only if it is adopted or combined with Israeli law through legislation. While the
Israeli government has ratified the international conventions discussed in this article
(some of which were ratified with specific reservations), they have not been
incorporated into domestic legislation. Thus, they have no formal effect in the Israeli
legal system and are not applied if they contradict Israeli law. The rights and duties
enumerated in these conventions, therefore, cannot be directly invoked by individuals,
and do not fall under the jurisdiction of Israeli courts.3 This article argues that despite
the fact that international conventions pertaining to the right to family life have not
been incorporated into Israeli law, the Supreme Court of Israel should give proper
weight to the right to family life as a fundamental human right grounded in principles
of international law, and that the Israeli legislature should take the necessary steps to
bring Israeli family law into conformity with the precepts of international law.
Part II of the article discusses the characteristics of the right to family life and
examines various definitions of the “family” under international and Israeli law. It
also examines what it is that the right to family life encompasses and how it should be
classified within the context of the accepted division into civil and political rights, on
the one hand, and social and economic rights, on the other hand. It argues that the
right to family life should not be viewed as limited solely to one category of rights or
another, since it has the characteristics of both a positive social right as well as those
of a negative civil right. Part III of the article analyzes the degree of protection
accorded to the family in various contexts, both in international and Israeli law,
including: the right of the family to social security, parent-child relations, and
immigration rights based on family ties. This part concludes that the State of Israel
provides adequate protection regarding most of these aspects of the right to family
life, except for its discriminatory practices against Arab Israeli citizens and
Palestinians in matters relating to immigration and family unification.
Part IV of the article, which discusses the freedom to marry, argues that Israeli law
exhibits a particular difficulty in the equal application of the right to family life
insofar as it relates to the right to marry, for the laws of marriage and divorce in Israel
are governed exclusively by religious law, which discriminates against various groups
of the population (women, persons without a religion, and persons disqualified for
religious marriage). International law, on the other hand, dictates the application of
the right to marriage without discrimination. The conclusion of this part of the article
is that the only way to guarantee equality within the family context – and to ensure the
right of every individual to marry, free of the shackles of religious law, as mandated
by international law – is the introduction of civil marriage in Israel.

3

See Ruth Lapidoth, “International Law within the Israel Legal System,” 24 Isr. L. Rev. 451, 459
(1990); N. Lerner, “International Law and the State of Israel,” in Introduction to the Law of Israel, Id.
at 383, 386-387. See also Yaffa Zilbershats, “The Adoption of International Law into Israeli Law: The
Real is Ideal,” 25 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 243 (1996).
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II. Characteristics of the Right to Family Life
A. The Right to Family Life – A Fundamental Right
The right to family life is a fundamental right of the highest degree that has attained
broad and comprehensive protection in international law. A first expression of the
recognition of the right to family life as a basic human right, and of the protection of
the family unit, may be found in Articles 12, 16 and 25 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which state as follows:
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference.
Article 16
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during
marriage and at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services…
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection.
Moreover, the right to family life is enshrined in a significant number of international
and regional conventions that emphasize the centrality and social importance of the
family unit, and which list the right to family life as a fundamental right. First and
foremost, the right is enunciated both in the Covenant on Social Rights and in the
Covenant on Civil Rights. Article 10(1) of the Covenant on Social Rights states that:4
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that …
[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be
accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and
while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent
children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent
of the intending spouses.

4

Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 1. The Covenant was ratified by Israel in 1991.
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Similar protection is granted to the institution of the family under Articles 17 and 23
of the Covenant on Civil Rights; These provisions state, respectively, as follows:5
Article 17
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honor and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.
Article 23
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and
to found a family shall be recognized.
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate
steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as
to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of
dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of
any children.

Specific protection for children within the family context may be found in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child6; likewise, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women includes provisions that grant
comprehensive protection to women in the context of the family.7 Among regional
conventions, comprehensive protection for the family institution may be found in the
European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.8
5

Covenant on Civil Rights, supra note 1. The Covenant was ratified by Israel in 1991.
See the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)
at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept.2 1990 (hereinafter: “Convention on the
Rights of the Child”). The Convention was ratified by Israel in 1991. Article 16 of the Convention
states that: “1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation; 2. The
child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
7
See Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3,
1981 (hereinafter: “Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women”). The
Convention was ratified by Israel in 1991. The State of Israel also ratified the Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women, 309 U.N.T.S. 65, entered into force Aug. 11, 1958. Article 3(1) of this
Convention states that: “Each Contracting State agrees that the alien wife of one of its nationals may, at
her request, acquire the citizenship of her husband through specially privileged naturalization
procedures; the grant of such citizenship may be subject to such limitations as may be imposed in the
interests of national security or public policy.”
8
See European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, October 4,
1950 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 (hereinafter: “The European Convention”):
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
6
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The right to family life has also been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right
in Israeli law. The Israeli legislature has enacted various arrangements intended to
encourage the family unit. Thus, for example, within the context of marriage, various
provisions that have been laid down are designed to foster a caring and intimate
relationship between spouses, in order to sustain and nurture the family unit.
Promotion of the emotional relationship between the spouses is achieved, inter alia,
by the following: granting a right to sick leave in order to care for an ill spouse9;
giving preference to the request of a foreign spouse to immigrate to and become
naturalized in the State of Israel, in order to live with his or her spouse10; the lack of
competence of one spouse to give evidence against the other spouse11; visitation
rights in prisons,12 etc. In a similar fashion, the Supreme Court has recognized the
right to family life as a “particularly important” fundamental right, pointing out that
every individual has “a basic right to marry and to establish a family.”13 The Court
has emphasized the social importance of the family unit in a long series of
judgments,14 adding that Israel is committed to protect the family unit under the
aforementioned international conventions.15
The Israeli Supreme Court has held that the right to family life – which, according to
the Court, encompasses the right of an individual to belong to a family unit, the right
of a couple to marry and live together, the right to bear children, the right of parents to
raise their children and care for them, and the right of children to grow up with their
parents – is grounded in the constitutional rights to privacy, self-fulfillment, dignity
and liberty, which are enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty: “In an
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 12 – Right to marry
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family,
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
9
Section 1 of the Sick Pay (Absence Because of a Spouse’s Sickness) Law, 1998.
10
Section 7 of the Nationality Law, 1952 (hereinafter: “Nationality Law”) provides that: “The spouse
of a person who is an Israeli national or who has applied for Israeli nationality … may obtain Israeli
nationality by naturalization …”. See also: Section 4A of the Law of Return, 1950 (hereinafter: “Law
of Return”). In this matter, the Court has ruled that “an extension of the right of return to family
members is intended to preserve the unity of the family, one member of which is Jewish”; HCJ
3648/97 Israel Stamka v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 53(2) 728, 755 (hereinafter: “Stamka”) [All
citations of Israeli case law refer to Hebrew versions, unless the existence of an English translation is
indicated]. Regarding limitations on rights of immigration and naturalization in Israel, in various
contexts, see infra, Part III.D.
11
See Section 3 of the Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 1971, which provides that “in a criminal
trial a spouse shall not be competent to give evidence against the other spouse.”
12
See Proposed Family Visits in Prison Facilities Law, 2003, of June 23, 2003 (“the link to the family
unit is considered a basic human need, necessary to the prisoner and his family … these needs are
among the minimal civilized human conditions of every prisoner who belongs to a family unit”). The
Bill may be viewed on the Knesset website <http://www.knesset.gov.il> (visited April 25, 2004)
[Hebrew].
13
See Stamka, supra note 10, at 781-82. See also the Court’s remarks in CFH 2401/95 Nachmani v.
Nachmani, P.D. 50(4) 661, 683 (hereinafter: “Nachmani”): “every person has the right to establish a
family and to bear children.”
14
See, for example, the comments of Justice Barak, regarding the essentiality of the family to the life
of Israeli society, in HCJ 639/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Registry at Ministry of Interior, P.D.
47(1) 749, 783 (hereinafter: “Efrat”).
15
Stamka, supra note 10, at 787.
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era in which ‘human dignity’ is a protected fundamental constitutional right, effect
should be given to the aspiration of a person to fulfill his personal being, and for this
reason, his desire to belong to the family unit that he considers himself part of should
be respected.”16
However, although the case law has recognized the right to family life as a
fundamental constitutional right, it has not been enshrined as a negative civil right in
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, nor as a positive social right in the
Proposed Basic Law: Social Rights, in its different versions.17 Among other things,
the Proposed Law enumerates the right to education, the right to health, and the right
to housing and social welfare, but surprisingly, it does not include the right to family
life.18

B. The Definition and Scope of the Right to Family Life
As indicated by the provisions of the aforementioned international conventions, the
right to family life encompasses, first and foremost, the following: the right to marry;
the right to be a parent; equality between the sexes within the family context;
protection for children within the family context; and the family’s right to privacy.
The right to family life also includes the right of individuals within the family to not
be exposed to physical violence or verbal abuse; the right of family members to live
together in the same country (“family unification”); the right of single-parent families
and large families to receive state assistance; protection for working mothers and
safeguards related to pregnancy and childbirth; the right to benefit from the
educational and cultural resources of the state; the right to an adequate standard of
living; and the right to family health services.
These rights are not based on a clear, standard definition of the term “family,” but
rather derive from an individual examination of the various needs and functions of
the family. Determining the scope of the right to family life, and identifying those
persons entitled to benefit from it, mainly depends, therefore, on the definition given
to the term “family.” It appears impossible to find a single, clear, exhaustive and
standard definition for the concept of the “family” – whether in international law,
comparative law or Israeli law. Article 10(1) of the Covenant on Social Rights deals
with “family rights,” but does not define what constitutes a “family”19 (although, a
16

CA 7155/96 John Doe v. Attorney General, P.D. 51(1) 160, 175. An English translation of this
judgment may be found on the official website of the Israeli Judicial Authority at
<http://www.court.gov.il> (visited April 25, 2004).
17
See Proposed Basic Law: Social Rights, 1994 (two versions) and Proposed Basic Law: Social Rights,
2002.
18
Even if we do not read a right to family life into the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and
even if it will not be enshrined in the Basic Law: Social Rights, then, as a basic human right, it is still
appropriate to examine every provision that infringes on the right to family life according to the
standards outlined in the limitation clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. See HCJ
5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation, P.D. 51(4) 1, 41-3. An English translation of this
judgment may be found on the official website of the Israeli Judicial Authority at
<http://www.court.gov.il> (visited April 25, 2004).
19
The member states that are parties to the Covenant give substance and meaning to the term “family”
as accepted in each and every country. See P. Alston, “The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,” Manual on Human Rights Reporting Under Six Major International
Human Rights Instruments (U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1 (1991)) 39, 57. In the General Comment of the
Human Rights Committee of 1990, it was noted “that the concept of the family may differ in some
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patriarchal view of the family institution may be inferred from the Covenant20).
Furthermore, a meticulous search in other international conventions, in decisions of
various international tribunals, and in Israeli law – as well as the law of other legal
systems – demonstrates that a satisfactory definition for this concept cannot be found.
The lack of consensus regarding the definition of the family is not evident only in the
legal realm, but also, and primarily, in the fields of sociology and anthropology.21
The nature and perception of the “family” change from place to place and from time
to time, and are dependent on points of view as well as on social and cultural
conditions. Historically, the family has been defined as a permanent, monogamous,
heterosexual institution, based on marriage, and including a clear division of gender
roles. Determining who counts as a “family member,” who is a “spouse,” what is a
“marriage,” and who is considered a “parent,” has long been based on widely
accepted legal and social perceptions. However, these perceptions have been
questioned – mostly in the past few decades – as a result of social, legal and political
changes.22
From a sociological point of view, it is customary to draw a distinction between the
“traditional” family (“extended family”) and the “modern” family (“nuclear
family”),23 and between both of these and the “post-modern” family.24 The
traditional family and the modern family are based on ties of blood and marriage, and
they differ in regard to the degrees of relation included in the definition of the term.
The post-modern family encompasses also relations that are not based on blood or
marriage (such as, unmarried heterosexual couples and same-sex partners), “absent”
family relations (such as single-parent families), and the “bi-nuclear” family, where
respects from State to State, and even from region to region within a State, and that it is therefore not
possible to give the concept a standard definition.” See Human Rights Committee, General Comment
19, Article 23 (Thirty-ninth session, 1990), Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 28
(1994)) (hereinafter: “G.C. 19”). Even prior to this, the UN Human Rights Committee stated that the
term “family” in this Covenant, as in other conventions, should be interpreted as including: “All those
comprising the family as understood in the society of the State Party concerned” (Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 16, (Twenty-third session, 1988), Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (U.N. Doc.
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 21 (1994).
20
Despite the existence of provisions that deal with equal rights for women (see infra, Part IV.C), the
man is the universal subject of the Covenant. Article 11 of the Covenant on Social Rights provides that
“[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family …” (emphasis added). As such, the Covenant presumes that it is the
man who requires an adequate standard of living for his family, an assumption based on the perception
that it is the man who heads the family. D. Otto, “’Gender Comment’: Why does the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights need a General Comment on Women?,” 14 Canadian Journal
of Women and the Law 1, 19 (2002).
21
For different and varied definitions of the concept of the “family” in the fields of sociology and
anthropology, see R. Bar-Yosef, “Sociology of the Family in view of Social Changes and
Biotechnological Innovations,” 38(1) Megamot 5 (1996) [Hebrew].
22
N. Bala & R.J. Bromwich, “Context and Inclusivity in Canada's Evolving Definition of the Family,”
16 International Journal of Law Policy and the Family 145 (2002).
23
See Z. Falk, Marriage Law (1983) 11 [Hebrew]. The accepted definition of the family in the field of
sociology, since the 1940s and up to this day and age, is that of Murdock, who defines the nuclear
family as one that includes a married man and woman and their offspring: G.P. Murdock, Social
Structure (New-York, 1949) 1-2. Bar-Yosef argues that Murdock’s model is incompatible with the
characteristics of the post-modern family; see Bar-Yosef, supra note 21.
24
For a discussion of the characteristics of the post-modern family in the State of Israel, see S. FogielBijaoui, “Families in Israel: Familism and Post-Modernism,” Sex, Gender and Politics (1999) 107
[Hebrew].
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parents have separated and established new nuclear families. While, in reality, there
is no denying the existence of many different sorts of family units, it would appear
that Israeli law still essentially regards the nuclear family – based on a lawful
marriage between a man and a woman who have common children, whether
biological or adopted – as the normative family model, and finds it difficult to
recognize the wide variety of families that actually exist.25
As far as Israeli legislation is concerned, different definitions for the term “family”
may be found in various laws, the scope of the definition varying from law to law,
depending on the purpose of the statute. Furthermore, since the definition of
“family” is a functional context-dependent definition, it is even possible to find
different definitions for this concept within the same statute.26 Some laws adopt a
broad approach, while other statutes adopt a narrow approach.27 Examples of a broad
definition for the concept of the “family” may be found in the Prevention of Family
Violence Law, 199128 and the Family Courts Law, 1995.29 The definition of a
25

Such recognition finds only partial expression, mainly in the area of social rights. See, for example,
the Single-Parent Families Law, 1992 (hereinafter: “Single-Parent Families Law”), which grants
various benefits to a single-parent, such as preferential admissions to day-care centers or an increased
state loan for housing purposes; in a similar fashion, same-sex partnerships have been accorded limited
recognition that finds expression in the right of a same-sex partner to receive various employment
benefits routinely granted to partners of a different sex. See HCJ 721/94 El Al v. Danilowitz, P.D.
48(5) 749 (hereinafter: “Danilowitz”). An English translation of this judgment may be found on the
official website of the Israeli Judicial Authority at <http://www.court.gov.il> (visited April 25, 2004).
The legal conception of the nuclear family as the normative model, up to the present day, is reflected,
for example, in the comments of Justice Porat in FA (Tel-Aviv) 10/99 Jane Doe v. Attorney General,
(unpublished), Takdin - District Court 2001(2) 125 (hereinafter: “Jane Doe I”), who refused to view a
lesbian couple and their children as a family unit and to grant them second-parent adoption, ruling that:
“the children in question have mothers and no one has expressed any doubt as to their fitness to raise
their children. Each one of the mothers chose to bring her children into the world without the
participation of a man in her life. What is lacking for these children (if it is indeed lacking) is a
father, but definitely not another mother” (emphasis added); at para. 18 of the judgment. See also
B. Schereschewsky, Family Law (Fourth Edition, 1993) 1 [Hebrew], in which Prof. Schereschewsky
defines the institution of the “family” as follows: “A family for the purposes of family law means all
those persons who are related to one another by blood or by marriage.”
26
In this matter, compare, for example, the definition of “family relation” in Section 174A(g) of the
Municipalities Ordinance (New Version), which deals with restrictions on the employment of a family
relation (“‘family relation’ – a spouse; a parent; a son or daughter and their spouses; a brother or sister
and their children; a brother-in-law or sister-in-law; an uncle or aunt; a father-in-law or mother-in-law;
a son-in-law or daughter-in-law; a grandson or granddaughter; including step-relations or adoptive
relations”), to the definition of “family member” in Section 235A(a) of the same Ordinance (“a spouse,
a child, a parent, a brother or sister, a grandson or granddaughter, a great-grandson or greatgranddaughter”).
27
Regarding this distinction, see the Report by the State of Israel to the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Ministry of Justice: Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1998) E/1990/5/Add.39(1) (hereinafter: “Israeli Report to the
UN Committee”). The Report may be viewed at:
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.1990.5.Add.39(1).En?OpenDocument> (visited April
25, 2004).
28
Section 1 of the Prevention of Family Violence Law, 1991 (hereinafter: “Prevention of Family
Violence Law”) defines “family member” as follows: “(1) a spouse, a parent or the spouse of a parent,
a parent of a spouse or the parent’s spouse, a grandfather or a grandmother, an offspring or the
offspring of a spouse, a brother or a sister, a brother-in-law or a sister-in-law, an uncle or an aunt, a
nephew or a niece; (2) a person responsible for the sustenance, health, education or welfare of a minor
or incapacitated person residing with him, and a minor or incapacitated person residing with a person
responsible for him, as stated.” The statute also provides that the term “family member” includes
“someone who was a family member in the past,” and that the term “spouse” includes “a common-law
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“family member” in these two statutes includes, inter alia, a “reputed spouse” (a
category akin to common law spouses) and a former spouse, children (including the
children of a spouse), a parent and the spouse of a parent, the parents of a spouse and
their spouses, a grandfather and a grandmother, brothers and sisters, and brothers-inlaw and sisters-in-law.30 This broad definition is not based only on marital relations
and blood ties, but also on relations between reputed spouses and their families. On
the other hand, there are statutes that adopt a narrow language insofar as it relates to
the definition of a “family member.” The narrow definition is solely based on blood
ties and marital relations, and does not include, for example, a reputed spouse, or
even the family of a spouse. Thus, for example, the National Insurance Law
(Consolidated Version), 1995 (hereinafter: the “National Insurance Law”), provides
that a “family member” only includes “one of the parents, a child, a grandchild, a
brother or a sister.”31 In a similar fashion, the Equal Opportunities in Employment
Law, 1988, provides that a “family member” is “a spouse, a parent, a child, a
grandchild, a brother, a sister, or a spouse of any of these.”32 Definitions that are
narrow, to one degree or another, may be found in a long list of additional statutes.33
In contrast to the variety of statutory definitions of the “family,” it is difficult to find
an attempt to define this concept in Israeli case law and legal literature.34 It seems
spouse.” This definition also applies to several other statutes: see, for example, Section 3 of the Law
Against Stalking, 2001.
29
Section 1 of the Family Courts Law, 1995 (hereinafter: “Family Courts Law”) defines a “family
member” as: a spouse – including a common-law spouse, a former spouse, a spouse the marriage to
whom has been dissolved – provided that the subject of the claim derives from the relationship between
them during the period when they were a couple; a child, including the child of a spouse; parents, the
parents of a spouse or their spouses; a grandchild; the parents of parents; brothers and sisters, or the
brothers and sisters of a spouse. Furthermore, the term “parent” is defined as “including an adoptive
parent or a guardian.”
30
The Prevention of Family Violence Law even includes uncles and aunts, and nieces and nephews,
while the Family Courts Law also includes grandchildren as “family members.” In keeping with its
objective, the Prevention of Family Violence Law provides a broad definition that even applies to the
relationship between someone who is responsible for a minor/incapacitated person residing with him or
her and the minor/incapacitated person.
31
Section 1 of the National Insurance Law. This definition is identical to that found in Section 1 of the
Planning and Building Law, 1965.
32
Section 21(a)(1) of the Equal Opportunities in Employment Law, 1988. For a similar definition, see
the Victims of Road Accidents (Assistance to Family Members) Law, 2002: “’family member’ – a
spouse, a child, a parent, a brother or a sister, or another family member who was dependent upon the
road accident victim.”
33
See, for example, Section 8(7) of the National Health Insurance Law, 1994, which defines “family”
as follows: “An individual and his spouse and their children up to the age of 18, or an individual and
his children up to the age of 18.” Also, see and compare Section 17A(b) of the Government
Companies Law, 1975; Section 351(e) of the Penal Law, 1977 (hereinafter: “Penal Law”); Section 1 of
the Fallen Soldiers’ Families (Pensions and Rehabilitation) Law, 1950; Section 1 of the Invalids
(Pensions and Rehabilitation) Law, 1959 (Consolidated Version); Section 28F of the Political Parties
Law, 1992; Section 2 of the Crime Victims’ Rights Law, 2001. See also Proposed Basic Law: The
Family, drafted by the New Family Organization <http://www.newfamily.org.il> (visited April 25,
2004), which defines “family” as follows: “(1) married couples; (2) unmarried adult couples unrelated
by blood who live together in the same home, maintain a joint household and are mutually committed
to a shared life; (3) an adult and a minor maintaining a joint household, where the adult is the parent or
legal guardian of the minor.”
34
While it is extremely difficult to find a clear definition for the term “family” in Israeli case law and
legal literature, a very comprehensive discussion may be found, in this context, regarding the definition
of the term “spouse,” which constitutes a basic element of the “family.” Opinions are divided on this
subject and various questions remain unanswered, such as: For the purposes of family law, as well as in
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that the courts, as well as most legal scholars assume that the definition of the family
is obvious; in fact, they appear to be referring to the nuclear family. Thus, for
example, in the Ofri case, Justice Orr held that for the purposes of the matter in
question “there is no reason to interpret this broad term, ‘family,’ the meaning of
which is known to all, as if it only refers to this or that specific person” (emphasis
added).35 Nevertheless, on this subject, the Israeli courts usually follow the lead of
the legislature; in other words, when it comes to the meaning of the term “family,”
the court adopts a functional approach, taking into account the purposes of the
relevant statute.36

C. The Right to Family Life: A Social-Civil Right
Traditionally, international legal scholars have distinguished between the
characteristics of the rights enunciated in the Covenant on Civil Rights and the
characteristics of the rights enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights. Thus, for
example, Scott has proposed the distinctions listed in the following table:37
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Positive
Resource-Intensive
Progressive
Vague
Unmanageably Complex
Ideologically Divisive/Political
Non-Justiciable
“Aspirations” or “Goals”

Civil and Political Rights
Negative
Cost-Free
Immediate
Precise
Manageable
Non-Ideological/Non-Political
Justiciable
“Real” or “Legal” rights

The most prevalent distinction is that found in the first line of the table: it is
customary to classify the rights enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights as
“positive” rights, which necessitate the intervention of state authorities for their
implementation (such as providing minimal means of subsistence), and the rights
enunciated in the Covenant on Civil Rights as “negative” rights, which mandate state
noninterference, or an obligation to refrain from activity that may infringe on a right
(such as freedom of expression).38 These distinctions have been criticized and it has
other legal contexts, should a common-law partner be included within the definition of the term
“spouse” that appears in legislation?; Or: Is a same-sex partner also a “spouse” for the purpose of
recognizing various rights emanating from this status? See, for example: Danilowitz, supra note 25, at
785-86; CA 2000/97 Lindorn v. Karnit – Road Accident Victims Compensation Fund, P.D. 55(1) 12;
M. Shava, “The ‘Unmarried Wife’” 3 Iyunei Mishpat 484 (1973) [Hebrew].
35
CA 449, 464/88 Ofri v. Perlman, P.D. 45(1) 600, 609. Similarly, in most basic textbooks dealing
with family law in Israel, it is impossible to find a definition for the term. See, for example, P.
Shifman, Family Law in Israel (Second Edition, 1995, Volume I) [Hebrew]; A. Rosen-Zvi, Israeli
Family Law: The Sacred and the Secular (1990) [Hebrew]; M. Shava, The Personal Law in Israel
(Fourth Edition, 2001) [Hebrew].
36
Israeli Report to the UN Committee, supra note 27, at 76.
37
C. Scott, “The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion
of the International Covenants on Human Rights,” 27 Osgd Hall L.J. 768, 833 (1989).
38
For a discussion of additional distinctions between social rights and civil rights, including a survey of
their different historical development, the hierarchy between them, and their different political and
theoretical characteristics, see M.C.R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford, 1995) 8-9. Regarding the distinction
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been argued that the differences between the two categories of rights are not at all
obvious or unequivocal.39 And, indeed, there are political rights with characteristics
found in the right column of the table (for example, affirmative action) and social
rights with characteristics found in the left column of the table (for instance, the right
of association and the right to strike); furthermore, there are rights with
characteristics in both columns of the table, their exact nature varying according to
the context in which they are being discussed (like the prohibition against
discrimination).40 In this regard, even if we ignore the criticism and adhere to the
classic distinction between social rights and civil rights, not only would we find that
the right to family life is enunciated in both the Covenant on Civil Rights and the
Covenant on Social Rights,41 but also that this right, in its various aspects, has a
mixed nature: both civil and social. Several aspects of the right to family life have
more of a negative-civil nature than a positive-social nature, such as the demand for
recognition of the family’s right to privacy, as well as the right to marry and to
establish a family, and even the demand for equal rights between the sexes within the
context of the institution of marriage – all “legal” rights that may be implemented
immediately, without an investment of resources, and which mainly entail
noninterference by the state in the individual’s freedom of choice.42 On the other

between positive and negative human rights in international law, see, for example: C. Baez & others,
“Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights,” 8 Yearbook of Int'l Law 183, 223-24 (1999/2000); J.
Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder, 1993) 26.
39
There are those who argue that, ultimately, all human rights require the state to act in a positive
manner in order to ensure that all individuals have the opportunity to fully benefit from them. See A.
Hendriks, “The Right to Health Promotion and Protection of Women's Right to Sexual and
Reproductive Health Under International Law: The Economic Covenant and the Women's
Convention,” 44 Am. U.L. Rev. 1123, 1133 (1995).
40
See, for example: G. McGregor, “The International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural
Rights: Will it Get its Day in Court?,” 28 Man. L.J. 321, 334 (2002).
41
See Articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant on Civil Rights and Article 10 of the Covenant on Social
Rights. It is interesting to note that Article 10 of the Covenant on Social Rights provides that “the
widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family,” while it is customary to
interpret the term “protection” as an obligation on the part of the state to prevent interference, by third
parties, with the family institution; according to this interpretation, the wording of Article 10 is narrow
and only relates to the protection of the family in the sense of preventing interference, by certain
individuals, with the right of other individuals to family life. See Craven, supra note 38, at 109. If that
is the case, then the right to family life in the Covenant on Social Rights may be interpreted as a right
that is mainly negative in character. However, it should be remembered that, like the rest of the
provisions in the Covenant, Article 10 is also subordinate to the general implementation clause, Article
2(1), which imposes positive obligations on the state. Indeed, Article 10 of the Covenant does not
make use of the word “right,” and, therefore, prima facie, Article 2(1) does not apply to it. This
interpretation is unreasonable, and Article 2(1) should be read as also applying to Article 10 of the
Covenant, both in view of the intention of the Covenant’s drafters to lay down binding legal
obligations, and because it is not appropriate to interpret Article 10 in a different manner from the rest
of the Covenant’s provisions, since Article 2(1) was designed to lay down the responsibility of the
states regarding all provisions of the Covenant. Moreover, the Economic and Social Committee, in its
guidelines for the submission of reports, expressly used the term “rights” when it referred to Article 10
of the Covenant. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The
nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, para.1 of the Covenant) (Fifth session, 1990), Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (U.N.
Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 45 (1994)). Reporting Guidelines, UN Doc.E/1991/23, Annex IV, 97-9, UN
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3) (1991) (hereinafter: “G.C. 3”); Craven, supra note 38, at 135.
42
Within the context of the right to privacy, as well as the right to equality, a guarantee of full
enjoyment of the right necessitates the prior implementation of administrative safeguards, legal and
otherwise, against the possibility of an infringement of this right. That is to say, the state must also
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hand, other aspects of the right to family life have more of a positive-social nature
than a negative-civil nature: in this context, it is possible to include the family unit’s
right to receive economic assistance and social welfare from the state (such as
“maternity insurance”) – a right that necessitates positive intervention on the part of
the state, entailing an investment of resources, whereas both the manner and the rate
of implementation are dependent on the economic capability of the state. In my
view, it is not advisable to dissociate the civil characteristics from the social
characteristics of the right to family life,43 since those are different aspects of the
same material right. Therefore, for the remainder of this article, I will discuss both
the “negative” and the “positive” aspects of the right to family life.

III. Protection of the Right to Family Life in Various Fields – International and
Israeli Law
A. Protection of the Family Unit - General
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which serves as a
supervising body for the implementation of the Covenant on Social Rights, provides
clarifications, from time to time, regarding the interpretation of various provisions in
the Covenant (General Comments). However, the right to family life, enunciated in
Article 10 of the Covenant, has yet to be discussed by the Committee or to be
interpreted by international judicial tribunals.44 This is one of the reasons for the fact
that the appropriate degree of protection for the family unit, mandated by the
Covenant on Social Rights, has not been clarified to this very day. In any case, even
regarding those matters that the Committee discusses, and on which it publishes a
General Comment, its determinations are not considered a binding interpretation and,
therefore, the interpretation of the Covenant is generally left to the discretion of the
individual states.
In Israel, as in most countries, it is customary, in principle, to view the family cell as
an independent unit immune from state interference. In the words of the Supreme
Court, this approach is grounded in the recognition that the family is “the most basic
and ancient social unit in human history which was, is, and will be the foundation

take “positive” steps in order to guarantee the existence of a right that is, primarily, “negative.” See
Hendriks, supra note 39, at 1133-34.
43
It may be argued that, even though the right to family life is referred to in a similar fashion in both
the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Covenant on Social Rights, these should not necessarily be
viewed as overlapping references, but rather as referring to different aspects of the right. That is to say,
the right should be interpreted according to the context in which it appears. Therefore, to the extent
that the right to family life is mentioned in the Covenant on Social Rights, it should be interpreted as
requiring economic support for the family unit (i.e., its interpretation should be limited to the socioeconomic context); and when it appears in the Covenant on Civil Rights, it should be interpreted as
referring to the civil characteristics of the right to family life.
44
An attempt to give substance to the right to family life may be found, primarily, in judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights. For a discussion of this attempt, see infra text accompanying notes
69-70 and 128-32. Perhaps the lack of a special legal discussion regarding Article 10 of the Covenant
by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights may be explained by the fact that the
right to family life is a broad right encompassing numerous secondary rights that sometimes overlap
other rights.
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that serves and ensures the existence of human society.”45 The Court has further held
that: 46
In principle, the autonomy to establish a family, to plan a family
and to bear children is a matter of personal privacy. Human liberty
encompasses the freedom of independent choice on matters of
marriage, divorce, childbirth, and any other private matter within
the sphere of personal autonomy…. “The state does not interfere in
this sphere except for reasons of special weight justified by the
need to protect the right of the individual or a significant public
interest”…. The aspiration to minimize state involvement in
relations within the family unit, whether by direct intervention or
by means of the legal system, emphasizes the unit’s right to
autonomy, which is protected from interference both in the
relations between the family unit and the state, as well as in the
relations between the different members of the family unit. The
situations requiring intervention are usually sensitive and complex,
and it is needed when a crisis in the family unit has occurred that
calls for state intervention through the courts in order to obtain a
resolution that the parties themselves have failed to achieve.
The tendency to minimize state intervention in family relations is, therefore,
grounded in recognition of the privacy and autonomy of the family. For example, the
Supreme Court has ruled that “the parents are autonomous in reaching decisions in
everything regarding their children – education, lifestyle, place of residence, and so
forth, and the intervention of society and the state in these decisions is an exception
that must be justified.”47 Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a growing tendency of
increased intervention in the autonomy of the family unit as part of the
democratization and individualization processes taking place in the modern family.48
Such intervention is perceived of as justifiable when the familial environment
becomes oppressive and coercive.49 Thus, for example, the Prevention of Family
Violence Law allows for the issuance of a protection order prohibiting a person from
entering a dwelling where a family member resides or from being found within a
certain distance from such a dwelling, or from harassing a family member in any
manner and in any place.50 Furthermore, and as will be discussed below, the
requirement of protection for the right to family life is not limited to a demand for
state noninterference in family life or for intervention at a time of crisis, but also
includes the need to support the family unit for the purpose of its subsistence, welfare
and development, as well as a demand that the state identify those persons who are
entitled to benefit, without discrimination, from the definition of “family.”

45

CA 488/77 John Doe v. Attorney General, P.D. 32(3) 421, 434.
CA 5587/93 Nachmani v. Nachmani, P.D. 49(1) 485, 499, 501.
47
CA 577/83 Attorney General v. Jane Doe, P.D. 38(1) 461, 468, 485 (hereinafter: “Jane Doe II”).
48
See Fogiel-Bijaoui, supra note 24, at 109.
49
Id., at 127.
50
Section 2 of the Prevention of Family Violence Law, supra note 28. Another example is the power
to temporarily or permanently remove children from the custody of their parents, by means of an
adoption order pursuant to the Adoption of Children Law, 1981 (hereinafter: “Adoption of Children
Law”) and the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 1960 (hereinafter: “Youth Law”).
46
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We will focus below on the legal protection afforded the right to family life, to the
extent that this relates to the entire family, as a single unit. In this context, we will
discuss several specific rights derived from the right to family life, where reference to
the term “family” means the family in all its forms: the nuclear family, the extended
family and even “alternative” family ties. Nevertheless, as we shall see, most of the
legal protection and recognition is granted to the nuclear family, whether in regard to
the relations between (heterosexual) spouses or the relations between parents and
their children.

B. The Right of the Family to Social Security and Means of Subsistence
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides, among other
things, that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family … motherhood and childhood are entitled
to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection.” Article 11(1) of the Covenant on Social Rights
similarly provides that “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family,
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the
realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of
international co-operation based on free consent.” Article 10(1) of this Covenant also
mandates that the state accord protection and assistance to the family, to the widest
extent possible, “particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the
care and education of dependent children.” Sub-articles (2) and (3) add provisions
requiring that special protection be granted to women and children, as follows:51
(2) Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a
reasonable period before and after childbirth. During such
period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or
leave with adequate social security benefits.
(3)

Special measures of protection and assistance should be
taken on behalf of all children and young persons without
any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other
conditions. Children and young persons should be protected
from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in
work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or
likely to hamper their normal development should be
punishable by law. States should also set age limits below
which the paid employment of child labor should be
prohibited and punishable by law.

These provisions are designed to encourage the international community to
continuously raise the standard of living of family members, to ensure their economic
well-being and social development, and to create adequate conditions for the proper
establishment and functioning of the family unit. These declarations are highly
51

Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 1.
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significant in view of the tremendous resources at the disposal of the international
community, on the one hand, and the great poverty suffered by many families
throughout the world, on the other hand.52 These provisions demonstrate that, within
the context of the economic and social rights of the family, special emphasis has been
placed on the protection and assistance that should be granted to working mothers.53
It appears that the State of Israel, primarily through its social security system, affords
extensive support and protection to working mothers during pregnancy, childbirth
and post-childbirth care. As mandated by Article 10(2) of the Covenant on Social
Rights, the Employment of Women Law, 1954 (hereinafter: “Employment of Women
Law”) grants women the right (as well as the obligation) to take paid maternity leave
for a period of 12 weeks (while providing the opportunity for fathers to take half of
the maternity leave in lieu of the mother); the statute provides that an employer
cannot dismiss a female employee during her pregnancy, save under a permit from
the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs.54 The National Insurance Law provides a
series of benefits under the heading “maternity insurance,” including free
hospitalization for childbirth, maternity grants (and if more than two children are
born in a single birth – a maternity pension), maternity allowances for working
mothers during their maternity leave, and high risk pregnancy benefits.55

C. The Parent-Child Relationship
We have seen above that Article 10(3) of the Covenant on Social Rights provides,
inter alia, that “[s]pecial measures of protection and assistance should be taken on
behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of
parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from
economic and social exploitation.” Additional comprehensive safeguards for
children, within the context of the family, may be found in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Article 5 of this Convention provides that “States Parties shall
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents … to provide, in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present
Convention.” Article 18(1) further provides that: 56
States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of
the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for
the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the
case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for
the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of
the child will be their basic concern.
52

A. Belembaogo, The Family in International and Regional Human Rights Instruments (New York,
1999), at 7.
53
Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, supra note 7,
which deals with equal employment opportunities, is also designed to enable women to maintain their
economic independence. Therefore, the international community recognizes that family responsibility
does not need to adversely affect the equal opportunities of women within the context of the labor
market.
54
See Sections 6 and 9 of the Employment of Women Law.
55
Regarding the history of maternity insurance in Israel, and for details about the level of benefits, see
Israeli Report to the UN Committee, supra note 27, at 83-85.
56
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 6.
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The State of Israel grants various social benefits to families with children, including a
children’s pension from the National Insurance Institute, and economic assistance for
single-parent families, under both the Single-Parent Families Law and the Assurance
of Income Law, 1980.
Alongside the protection and assistance granted by the state to children, within the
family context, the law recognizes the right to parenthood – a right leading to the
imposition of various duties on parents vis-à-vis their children. The Supreme Court
has recognized that “the right to parenthood is a fundamental human right to which
every individual is entitled.”57 In a similar fashion, the Courtheld that: 58
The right of parents to raise and educate their children as they see
fit is a fundamental constitutional right, a natural right inherent in
and stemming from the relationship between parents and their
offspring. The family context does not stand apart from the
constitutional system, but is an integral part thereof. Within the
context of the family unit, parents are granted rights recognized
and protected by constitutional law. The right of parents to have
custody of their children and to raise them, with all this entails, is a
natural and primary constitutional right – an expression of the
natural connection between parents and their children [cite
omitted].
As stated in the Israeli Report to the UN Committee on the Implementation of the
Covenant on Social Rights, “the fundamental assumption of Israeli law is that the
initial obligation to support family members lies with the family itself”; whereas this
principle is enshrined, inter alia, in the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962,
which states that parents, as the natural guardians of their minor children, have “the
right to fulfill their duties” vis-à-vis their children,59 which include fulfilling their
needs and seeing to their education, their studies and the preservation of their
property.60 Nevertheless, when the need arises, and in accordance with the primary
principle of the “best interests of the child,” various statutes grant the state authority
to intervene in order to ensure the welfare of a minor; for instance, the power to
temporarily or permanently remove a child from the parents’ custody by means of an
adoption order under the Adoption of Children Law and the Youth Law.
Furthermore, the Penal Law imposes criminal sanctions on parents for neglecting,
assaulting or abusing their children, physically, emotionally or sexually.61
57

CA 451/88 John Does v. State of Israel, P.D. 44(1) 330, 337.
CA 2266/93 John Does v. Richard Roe, P.D. 49(1) 221, 235 (hereinafter: “John Does”).
59
ET 1/81 Nagar v. Nagar, P.D. 38(1) 365, 393; John Does, supra note 58, at 239-40.
60
Israeli Report to the UN Committee, supra note 27, at 80.
61
The “best interests of the child” principle also dictates, prima facie, that children not be harmed by
the status or acts of their parents. However, the application of religious law in matters of personal
status, which we will discuss in more detail below, also harms certain groups of children as a result of
the acts or status of their parents. Thus, for example, according to Jewish Law, a child born to a Jewish
mother and a non-Jewish father is not legally related to the father; likewise, a child born to a married
woman by a man who is not her husband is considered a mamzer [this term translates to English as
“bastard”, and it refers to the offspring of a forbidden union], something that imposes serious
limitations on the child’s legal capacity to marry, since a mamzer is forbidden to marry a Jew and may
only marry another mamzer or a non-Jew. See C. Shalev, “Freedom of Contract for Marriage and a
Shared Life,” in Women’s Status in Israeli Law and Society 459-60, 465, 479 (1995) [Hebrew].
58
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Just as various restrictions are placed on the right to marriage (see discussion below),
so too are various restrictions placed on the right to parenthood (in its “positive”
sense). The State of Israel grants extensive recognition to the right to parenthood,
insofar as it relates to married heterosexual couples, and even provides support and
assistance to married couples unable to bear children. Thus, for example, the
Adoption of Children Law states the principle whereby “[a]n adoption shall only be
made by a man and his wife jointly.”62 In a similar fashion, the Surrogacy
Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law, 1996 only allows
a man and a woman who are a couple to benefit from surrogacy arrangements.63 The
Supreme Court has refused to rule that these laws are discriminatory against
unmarried persons.64 Therefore, unmarried couples (or, in the case of surrogacy –
those who are not reputed spouses), single persons and same-sex couples may benefit
from the “negative” aspects of the right to parenthood, but not from its “positive”
aspects.65

D. Immigration Rights and “Family Unification”
One of the areas which reflect on the degree of commitment by the state to the right
to family life is immigration policy. In this context, a distinction should be made
between the immigration of all family members (usually, the migration of workers
and their families from one state to another66) and “family unification,”67 i.e., the
62

Section 3 of the Adoption of Children Law.
Section 1 of the Surrogacy Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law, 1996
(hereinafter: “Surrogacy Agreements Law”), defines those entitled to benefit from surrogacy
arrangements as follows: “‘intended parents’ – a man and a woman who are a couple, who enter into a
contract with a surrogate mother for the purpose of bearing a child.” For further discussion of the
Surrogacy Agreements Law, see Rhona Schuz, “The Right to Parenthood: Surrogacy and Frozen
Embryos,” in Bainham, A. (ed.) The International Survey of Family Law, p. 237 (1996)
64
See HCJ 2458/01 New Family v. Approvals Committee for Surrogate Motherhood Agreements,
Ministry of Health, P.D. 57(1) 419 (hereinafter: “New Family”), in which the Court deliberated the
question of the right of a single woman to use the services of a surrogate mother under the Surrogacy
Agreements Law, holding that the statute does not grant such a right; CA 1165/01 Jane Doe v. Attorney
General, P.D. 57(1) 69, which dealt with the question of whether the term “spouse” in Section 3 of the
Adoption of Children Law also includes a common-law spouse. In the end, the question was left for
further consideration, and the Court did not even rule that common-law spouses are entitled to jointly
adopt a foreign child. To the extent that this relates to the right of one partner of a same-sex couple to
adopt the biological child of the other, the District Court has ruled that the law does not permit such an
adoption; see Jane Doe I, supra note 25; an appeal of this judgment is pending before the Supreme
Court. In HCJ 1779/99 Berner-Kadish v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 54(2) 368, the Court ordered the
Ministry of Interior to register a lesbian couple as the dual mothers of the biological child of one of
them, who was adopted by the other in California. A motion has been submitted for a further hearing
of this decision, and it is pending before an expanded panel of the Supreme Court.
65
Unlike adoption and surrogacy, which, as stated, are restricted to a man and a woman who are a
couple (to the extent that this relates to adoption, even individuals are entitled to adopt a child under
certain conditions), the Supreme Court nullified the policy that discriminated between married and
single women (including lesbian women), regarding the unrestricted access to artificial insemination
services. See HCJ 2078/96 Weitz v. Minister of Health (unpublished) (hereinafter: “Weitz”).
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immigration of one spouse in order to live together with the other spouse, or the
immigration of children/parents in order to live with or near their parents/children. In
this article, we will deal with the second type of immigration, i.e. family unification
aimed at protecting the right to family life, in two main contexts: first, the
immigration rights of a foreign spouse, based on marriage; second, the immigration
rights of foreign parents or children, based on the parent-child relationship.
1. Immigration Rights Based on Marriage
The principle whereby the state grants immigration rights to a foreign spouse does
not stem from the recognition of a duty on the part of the state vis-à-vis the foreigner,
but rather from its obligation to recognize and enforce the right of the spouse who is a
citizen to enjoy the benefits of family life in his or her own country – if the foreign
spouse is not permitted to immigrate, then, in effect, the spouse who is a national is
forced to leave the country in order to realize his or her right to family life.
Therefore, granting immigration rights to the foreign spouse primarily constitutes
recognition of the right to family life of the spouse who is a citizen.68 The European
Court of Human Rights has long recognized that the right to family life enshrined in
Article 8 of the European Convention may impose positive duties on the state in the
field of immigration.69 Nevertheless, the Court has allowed the state broad discretion
to choose which foreigners will enter into or be deported from its territory, and
greater weight is sometimes given to this prerogative than to the right to family life. 70
The Israeli Supreme Court has also been asked to deliberate this issue in a series of
cases. A comprehensive discussion regarding the discretion of state authorities in
granting citizenship to the foreign spouse of an Israeli national may be found in the
Stamka case,71 which debated the reasonable basis for the Ministry of Interior policy
regarding the naturalization process for a non-Jewish foreign spouse married to a
Jewish Israeli in a “mixed marriage.” Under this policy, which had been in effect
since 1995, a non-Jewish foreign spouse, who had married a Jewish Israeli citizen
workers. See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, G.A. res. 45/158, annex, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990).
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while illegally staying in Israel, was required to leave the country for several months
during which the Ministry of Interior would check whether this was a fictitious or a
genuine marriage; once it was determined that the marriage was authentic, the spouse
would then be entitled to return to Israel in order to begin the naturalization process.
The naturalization process itself lasted many years and was preceded by a trial period
for permanent residence, whereas the request for naturalization would only be
discussed at the end of the trial period; this, because marriage to an Israeli, in and of
itself, does not grant a foreigner the right to naturalization 72 (this lengthy process
applies equally to a foreign spouse legally staying in Israel at the time that the
marriage was performed). This policy had been formulated as part of the discretion
granted to the Minister of Interior by the Entry into Israel Law, 1952 (hereinafter:
“Entry into Israel Law”) and the Nationality Law. Contrary to the wording of
Section 4A of the Law of Return, the Supreme Court ruled that, in view of the
purpose of this statute (i.e., to avoid splitting up the families of mixed marriages
among the Jews of the Diaspora and to encourage their immigration to Israel), the
foreign non-Jewish spouse was not entitled to the rights that the Law of Return and
the Nationality Law grant to the spouse of a Jewish immigrant (to the extent that this
relates to citizenship by right of return), because this arrangement is intended to apply
to the family members of Jews prior to their immigration to Israel, and not to the
foreign spouse of a Jew who is a citizen of the State of Israel at the time of the
wedding. Accordingly, it was ruled that Jews who are Israeli citizens could not
impart a right of return to their non-Jewish spouses. In this way, the Court denied the
foreign spouse the benefit of acquiring citizenship by right of return, which bestows
social rights such as an “absorption package,” and the like. However, the Court
further ruled that the Ministry of Interior requirement, whereby the foreign spouse
had to leave the country until the authenticity of the marriage could be determined,
was “incompatible with the axioms of a democratic regime bent on the preservation
of civil rights”73; this policy does not meet the test of proportionality and is therefore
null and void.74 The Court based its ruling on the fundamental right to family life
and, within its context, the right to marriage, as these are recognized by international
law: 75
The Respondents did not properly weigh the individual’s right
to marriage, and the grave harm to family life attendant upon
the policy that they adopted for themselves. Regarding the harm
to a fundamental right, our colleague, Justice Dorner, has said in
Tenufa Personnel Services case (HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Ltd. v.
Minister of Labor and Welfare, P.D. 52(2) 433), at p. 452: “As
regards the test for selecting the means that causes the lesser harm,
which, as stated, is not an absolute test, the selection of the means
will be affected by the right that is infringed. When this is a
particularly important fundamental right, greater care will be taken
in selecting the means that cause minimal harm, even where the
cost of employing the means is substantial.” We should
remember that the present case revolves around the
72
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fundamental right granted to the individual – every individual
– to marry and to establish a family. Needless to say, this right
has been recognized in international conventions accepted by
all […] Indeed, the magnitude of the right and the powerful
radiation that shines from within it, would dictate, as if of
themselves, that the means chosen by the Ministry of Interior be
milder and more moderate than the harsh and drastic action that it
decided to take. And it is hard for us not to conclude that the
Respondents completely disregarded – or gave minimal weight
to – these fundamental rights of the individual to marry and to
establish a family. (emphases added).
Insofar as it concerns the naturalization process, the Court has held that an immigrant
who is a foreign spouse constitutes a special category and that therefore his or her
right to citizenship “is superior to the right of others.”76 This, too, is based on the
recognition of the fundamental right to family life.
The naturalization of a spouse is regulated by Section 7 of the Nationality Law, under
the heading “Naturalization of Husband and Wife.” According to this provision,
“[t]he spouse of a person who is an Israeli national or who has applied for Israeli
nationality and meets or is exempt from the requirements of Section 5(a) may obtain
Israeli nationality by naturalization even if he or she does not meet the requirements
of Section 5(a).” The main purpose of this provision, which allows flexibility in the
requirements for a spouse’s naturalization, is the desire to preserve the integrity of the
family unit, and to avoid a disparity between the nationalities of the spouses.77
Nevertheless, the provision does not grant the spouse of an Israeli national automatic
citizenship on the basis of marriage, since Section 5(b) of the statute – according to
which naturalization is at the discretion of the Minister of Interior – also applies to
the naturalization of a spouse.78
As Justice Cheshin explains in Stamka: 79
Section 7 of the Nationality Law upholds international
commitments that Israel has undertaken, and according to which it
is obligated to facilitate the naturalization of married women. In
the language of Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Nationality
of Married Women: “Each Contracting State agrees that the alien
wife of one of its nationals may, at her request, acquire the
nationality of her husband through specially privileged
naturalization procedures; the grant of such nationality may be
subject to such limitations as may be imposed in the interests of
national security or public policy.” The wording of the Convention
expresses a will to protect the rights of women, however,
considering the principle of equality customary in our country, it
may be said – in principle – that this right is also granted to men.
76
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The purpose of the statute – in Section 7 – is to protect the rights of
the spouse, which indicates that the Minister of Interior must
incorporate this purpose in the policy established for implementing
the provisions of Section 7.
Justice Cheshin further ruled that, indeed, Section 7 of the statute does not eliminate
the discretion granted to the Minister of Interior under Section 5(b), however, it
should be interpreted as granting special privileges based on marriage in the sense
that the Minister should exercise the discretion granted to him by Section 7 and, in
worthy cases, waive any of the requirements listed in Section 5(a) of the statute,
particularly the requirement of permanent residence in Israel.80 This ruling gives
proper substance to Section 7 of the statute, since its practical effect is to shorten the
process by approximately six years and to significantly ease the naturalization of a
foreign spouse.
Thus, in Stamka, the Court saw fit to nullify the policy of the Ministry of Interior
according to which the foreign spouse would be deported for several months in order
to determine the authenticity of the marriage, as well as its policy stipulating that the
hearing for a naturalization application would only commence after the obligatory
period of time needed to grant the foreign spouse with permanent resident status had
elapsed. The Court based its decision on the argument that these policies were
extremely detrimental to the fundamental right to marriage and family life, while
expressly recognizing the state’s commitment to protect the family unit in view of the
norms of international law in this matter.81
Even so, it would appear that the Supreme Court does not adopt a uniform stance
concerning the fundamental right to family life in the realm of immigration law.
Whereas, in Stamka, the Supreme Court granted a superior status to the right to
family life, both rhetorically and in the application of the right to the facts of the case,
it does not apply this insight to other judgments, even when rhetorically recognizing,
in the words of Justice Cheshin, “the powerful radiation that shines” from within the
right. This lack of uniformity is embodied in decisions of the Supreme Court
regarding applications for “family unification” by residents of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, i.e., applications for permission from the State of Israel to bring a nonresident spouse into the region, so that he or she may cohabit permanently with a
spouse who is a resident.82 In the Shahin case, the applicants, who lived in the
80
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Occupied Territories, claimed that the State of Israel’s refusal to permit women
married to residents of the region to remain in the territories with their spouses was a
violation of the principles of international humanitarian law.83 The petitioners relied
on Article 27 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, 1949, which states that “Protected Persons are entitled, in all
circumstances, to respect for ... their family rights.”84 Similar protection of the right
to family life may be found in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations (IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, of 1907, which provides that “[f]amily honor
and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions
and practice, must be respected.”85 These two provisions require that the occupier
protect the right to family life, but it is doubtful that they also mandate family
unification in those cases where the marriage to a foreign resident was entered into
after the occupation, since the separation of the family requesting to be united is not
necessarily a result of the state of war and the occupation.86
The policy of the military government in the Occupied Territories during the 1980s
was to limit the approval of requests for family unification, since the military
government no longer viewed such applications as authentic requests, but rather as “a
means for immigration into the regions.”87 In order to attack this policy, the
petitioners in Shahin relied on two legal opinions by experts in international law.
These experts expressed their view that the military government’s refusal to permit
family unification was in violation of aforesaid Articles 27 and 46. According to the
legal opinion by Prof. Brownlie of Oxford University, the State of Israel is obligated
to grant a permit of stay and permanent residence to the foreign spouses in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, for otherwise it is harming the “unity of family life,” in
violation of Article 27.88 Prof. Brownlie concluded that this unjustified harm to
family life constitutes a violation of a human rights norm that applies to the State of
Israel under customary international law.89 According to the legal opinion of Prof.
Shelton, from the University of Santa Clara, Israel is, indeed, entitled to regulate the
entry into and the stay of foreigners in its territory, but this prerogative should not be
abused and must be balanced against the right of the individual to marry and to
establish a family.90 Prof. Shelton pointed out that, in certain circumstances,
preventing the entry of a foreigner into the territory of the state may constitute a
violation of the right to marry and to establish a family: “The right to marry and
found a family is generally recognized in international law and has been applied to
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require permitted residence in a state of which an individual may not be a national.
Denial of family unification amounts to an abuse of right in such situations.”91
The Supreme Court rejected the conclusions reached in these legal opinions and ruled
that both the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention “do not contain
any explicit reference pertaining to family unification, in general, or to the right of
foreign citizens to enter a militarily occupied area.”92 Moreover, the Court has ruled
that “general principles have not been formulated that create a binding, general
customary norm regarding a militarily occupied area, and no precedents have been
established in this field which serve as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.”93
Therefore, in Shahin, the Court gave very little weight, if any, to the right to family
life as a fundamental human right grounded in principles of international law.
Indeed, the Court did note that “family unification is always considered an important
humanitarian matter,” but added that the treatment of these matters has always been
“on the basis of ad-hoc arrangements specific to the circumstances of each case,
which have varied according to the security and political conditions at the time.”94
The policy of the military government regarding family unification for residents of
the Occupied Territories is similar, in one respect, to the Ministry of Interior policy
within the borders of the State of Israel up to the Stamka decision. This similarity is
reflected in the fact that the Ministry of Interior, like the military government, has not
viewed the marriage to a foreign spouse as a genuine marriage but rather as a
fictitious marriage designed to enable the foreign spouse to legally remain in the
State of Israel. However, whereas the foreigner married to an Israeli national was
required to leave the country for several months and was entitled to return to Israel
afterwards and begin the naturalization process, the refusal to permit family
unification for Arab residents of the Occupied Territories and their foreign spouses
sealed the fate of their applications and caused a grave and irreversible harm to their
right to family life. Moreover, and despite the similarity between the two cases, in
contrast to Stamka – where the Court ruled that each case should be judged on its
own merits, and that the general policy of deporting the foreigner from Israel, until
after an examination of the authenticity of the marriage, was null and void – in
Shahin, insofar as it concerns residents of the Occupied Territories, the Court ruled
that a concrete, individual examination, on the merits, of each request for family
unification based on marriage, was not required, and that the military government
was entitled to treat this as a general “phenomenon” of mass immigration and to
implement general measures that would apply to most requests for family unification,
in view of the “state of war” in the Occupied Territories95; therefore, in view of the
“general security, political and economic implications of the phenomenon, and its
91
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consequences,” the Supreme Court approved the minimalist policy of the military
government.96
Regarding family unification in Israel, as opposed to family unification in the
Occupied Territories, Justice Cheshin has said, in Stamka: 97
Pertaining to the grant of rights to the foreign spouses, the parties’
counsels have used the term “family unification”; however, this is
not the correct term, and we should clarify this at the outset. A
distinction should be made between “family unification,” insofar
as it relates to the Occupied Territories – and in that context, this is
the correct term to use – and the use of the term and its application
to the territory of the State [of Israel]. Prima facie, these matters
are similar in nature, since both cases relate to the desire of family
members to live together.
However, despite the (partial)
substantive identity between “family unification” in the Occupied
Territories and “family unification” in Israel, there is no legal
identity: the law is different, the competent authority is different,
the nature of the right is different. We do not intend to go into
detail in regard to arrangements for “family unification” in the
Occupied Territories. Our only intention is to state that no
inference can be made from these arrangements to the present case,
just as no inference can be made from the present case to aforesaid
arrangements. Each matter is a case unto itself.
In this same judgment, Justice Cheshin added that: 98
The State of Israel recognizes the right of the citizen to choose a
spouse according to his wishes and to establish a family in Israel
together with that person. Israel is committed to the protection of
the family unit under international conventions (see Article 10 of
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, and
Article 23.1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966);
and even though these conventions do not dictate any given policy
in the matter of family unification, Israel has recognized – has and
does recognize – its obligation to provide protection to the family
unit also by granting permits for family unification. In doing so,
Israel has affiliated itself with enlightened nations, those states that
recognize – subject to reservations regarding national security,
public safety and public welfare – the right of family members to
live all together in a territory of their choosing.
Despite the Supreme Court’s impressive rhetoric, the basic human right to family life
– “the fundamental right acquired by the individual - every individual - to marry and
to establish a family” – is in fact given different meanings in different contexts, such
96
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that while a Jewish Israeli citizen has the basic right to be united with a foreign
spouse, an Arab resident of the Occupied Territories requesting to be joined to a
foreign spouse is at the mercy of the military government, and this right is denied
because of one security reason or another; this was the case in 1986 (in Shahin) and
remains the case up to this very day (the obiter dictums in Stamka). Therefore, and to
the extent that it relates to the Occupied Territories – as Justice Cheshin notes, “the
nature of the right [to family life] is different.” Still, neither in Stamka nor in Shahin
does the Supreme Court explain the different nature of the right to family life in the
Occupied Territories, or, to be more exact: whether, apart from a declarative right,
the residents of the Occupied Territories are granted any right whatsoever to family
life. It would seem that the Supreme Court has not given proper weight to the
provisions of the first part of Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article
46 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which expressly provide that, even in a time of
war, the right to family life of the residents of the occupied region must be respected
(even if these provisions are not to be interpreted as requiring family unification in
the manner requested by the petitioners); this approach is puzzling in view of the
Court’s assumption that “Israel respects the humanitarian principles in the laws of
war and does not rely on the applicability, or lack thereof, of the Fourth
Convention.”99
In Shahin, the Court added that the right to family life enunciated at the beginning of
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention must be read together with the
reservation at the end of said provision, whereby “… the parties to the conflict may
take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be
necessary as a result of the war.”100 The question is whether this reservation justifies
the occupying state’s disregard of the need to respect the rights of the residents of the
occupied territory, rights enunciated at the beginning of the provision, especially
considering that there must be a causal relation between the adoption of such
measures of control and security and a state of war. In Shahin, the respondent’s
central argument was that “the family unification phenomenon … has become a
complicated and problematic issue with both political and security aspects – as a
means of immigration into the regions.”101 It is highly doubtful that this argument
can justify a policy that automatically rejects most applications for family unification
based on marriage to foreign nationals, except for some applications with special
circumstances. Furthermore, as the Court has noted in a different context, national
security “is not a magic word and its priority does not arise in every case and under
all circumstances, and it is not identical at all levels of security and the harm
thereto.”102
The fundamental right to marriage, as will be discussed below, is one of the most
basic expressions of the right to family life; it constitutes a right to establish a
family, unlike derivative rights of lesser importance, such as the right of adult
children to receive a permit of stay in order to live near their parents.103 Shouldn’t a
respect for the basic human right to family life lead the courts to critically examine
99
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the discretion of the competent authorities and the reasonableness of their policy, and
to hold, for example, that the rule of choice be the opposite, i.e., a hearing for each
application on the merits, and automatic rejection only in exceptional cases?104
Even if we accept the Court’s position – whereby, to the extent that it relates to the
Occupied Territories, the legal right (in our case, the right to family life) does not
need to be examined in isolation from the security background – it seems that it
would have been appropriate for the Court to set a balance between the right of the
State of Israel to prevent the entry of foreigners into the Occupied Territories for
security reasons and the right of the individual to marry and to establish a family. By
adopting the arguments of the military government without reservations, the Court
freed itself of the need to balance the different rights. Such a balance could have
been expressed, as stated above, by requiring that the military authorities individually
examine each request on the merits.105 It is true that the provisions of the aforesaid
conventions do not mandate that the State of Israel permit the entry of foreigners into
the Occupied Territories, just as the state has wide discretion to prevent foreigners
from settling in its own territory,106 however, approval of a policy that sweepingly
prohibits the immigration of spouses into the Occupied Territories is tantamount to a
disregard of the provisions of international humanitarian law regarding the right to
family life.
Therefore, it is no wonder that the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has recently censured this discriminatory practice, stating that it is “…
104
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concerned about the practice of restrictive family reunification with regard to
Palestinians, which has been adopted for reasons of national security.”107 As such,
the Committee has reiterated “… its recommendation [to Israel] contained in
paragraph 36 of its 1998 concluding observations that, in order to ensure equality of
treatment and non-discrimination, the State party undertake a review of its re-entry
and family reunification policies for Palestinians.”108

2. Immigration Rights Based On the Parent-Child Relationship
To the extent that it concerns recognition of the right of children to settle in the State
of Israel by virtue of their parents being Israeli citizens, the Nationality Law grants
citizenship on the basis of a family connection only to a child born in Israel to an
Israeli citizen (or born abroad to a parent who, at the time, was an Israeli citizen) and
to the spouse of an Israeli citizen. Apart from these categories, the law does not
expand the circle of eligibility to other family members, including children born to a
foreign spouse within a previous marriage to a spouse who was not an Israeli
citizen.109 The Harari case concerned two Burmese nationals who had requested
permission to remain in the State of Israel in order to live together with their mother,
who was an Israeli citizen. The Harari children were 19 and 21 years old at the time
that the petition was filed and, during their stay in Israel, their father, who lived in
Burma, had passed away. Accordingly, in their petition, they claimed that they had
no other home than their mother’s home in Israel. The policy of the Ministry of
Interior is to not give a permit for permanent residence to a foreign adult requesting
to be near a family member who is an Israeli national or resident, except to an elderly
parent of an Israeli national who remains alone and isolated in his or her country of
residence. The Supreme Court approved the Ministry of Interior policy and ruled that
adult children are not entitled to permanent residence in Israel by the fact that their
mother is an Israeli national.110 The Supreme Court thus rejected the petitioners’
argument and held that – to the extent that it concerns adult children – the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty does not mandate giving extra weight to the right of a
mother and her sons to live together.
The degree of recognition afforded to the right of a parent to settle in the State of
Israel by virtue of the fact that his or her children are Israeli nationals has been
deliberated more than once before the Supreme Court. In Kandel, the petitioners
argued, inter alia, that since their minor daughter was entitled to the visa of an oleh
107
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[the Hebrew term for a Jewish immigrant to Israel], they too were entitled to settle in
the country on the basis of oleh status under the Law of Return, based on the
daughter’s rights vis-à-vis the parents or the parents’ responsibilities vis-à-vis the
daughter, as her guardians.111 The Court rejected this argument, holding that a
minor’s right does not also encompass the rights of the parents: 112
A minor’s place is with his parents – where they reside, he shall
reside, and not the reverse. A minor is dependent on his parents –
the parents are not dependent upon him. As guardians, they
determine his place of residence – he does not determine their
place of residence. This category – the parents of a child eligible
under the Law of Return – is not included in the group of persons
eligible under Section 4A(a).
In Dimitrov, the petitioner was a foreigner married to an Israeli national, with whom
he had a minor daughter, born in Israel.113 After the couple had separated, and at the
request of the petitioner’s wife, the Ministry of Interior decided that, at the
conclusion of the divorce proceedings, the petitioner would be deported from Israel.
The petitioner requested to continue the naturalization process on the basis of his
marriage, but the Court rejected this argument because of the disintegration of the
marital relationship leading up to the petition.114 Another argument raised by the
petitioner was that the Ministry of Interior was obliged to grant him permanent
resident status, as the father of an Israeli national, under Section 2 of the Entry into
Israel Law. The Ministry of Interior policy in this matter is to deny foreigners a visa
for permanent residence in Israel, other than in exceptional cases and for special
reasons115; in the case in question, the Ministry of Interior had decided that there
were no special humanitarian circumstances to justify granting a permit for
permanent residence, since the girl was in the custody of her mother and the
petitioner would be allowed to enter Israel from time to time in order to visit her.116
The Supreme Court rejected the petition, holding that, in principle, the nationality of
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the child does not suffice to grant permanent resident status to a foreign parent; only
in exceptional cases, where special humanitarian circumstances exist, can a
foreigner’s parenthood of a minor who is an Israeli national justify granting the
parent the status of a permanent resident, but such circumstances did not exist in this
case.117
The Bornea case involved a petition by a foreign worker illegally staying in Israel,
whose marriage to an Israeli national had dissolved after a son was born to them;
consequent to the breakup of the marriage, the Ministry of Interior decided to
discontinue her naturalization proceedings.118 The petition dealt with the question of
whether or not the naturalization proceedings of a foreign spouse should be
terminated following the breakup of the marital relationship, when a child had been
born to the couple, in Israel, during the period of their marriage. In this case, too, as
in Dimitrov, the application was based on the connection between the parent and the
child, and not on the marital relationship that had dissolved and which had been the
basis for the approval of the original application for temporary residence. The
petitioner argued, inter alia, that the right to family life establishes a right for the
child to a relationship with both parents; and that the state authorities should take
measures to allow for the existence of an appropriate, regular and continuous
relationship between the child and his parents, and not to hinder it, even if one parent
is not an Israeli national and does not have a lawful status in Israel. The District
Court, sitting as a court for administrative matters, interpreted the petition as a
request to introduce a new criterion – i.e., the connection between a foreign parent
and a child born out of a marriage to a spouse with Israeli nationality – in order to
prevent the separation of the foreign parent from the child, even after the marriage
had dissolved.119 In rejecting the petition, the Court held that no distinction should be
made between the acquisition of a status based on a parental connection, under the
Law of Return (the Kandel case), and a request for permanent residence or a grant of
citizenship based on the same connection, under the Entry into Israel Law or the
Nationality Law.120 The Court further ruled that the legal right and the duty of the
parent to raise the child do not supersede the right of the state to bar the foreign
parent from obtaining permanent residence or Israeli citizenship solely on the basis of
the parental connection: 121
Balanced against the interest of a child’s right to live in a country
where both of his parents reside, so that they can both fulfill their
duties to raise him, to educate him, to nurture him, and to support
him, are the public interests and considerations of the state –
national security, public safety, maintenance of public order,
preservation of the character and culture of the nation, its identity,
its Jewish and democratic nature, and even considerations of
immigration policy based on economic and work force policy that
will encourage the employment of the citizens and residents of the
nation, ‘importing’ foreign laborers only when there is an absolute
necessity.
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Therefore, in the conflict between the best interests of the child and the immigration
policy of the State of Israel, the Court has held that the state interest is to be
preferred.
Time and again, it would seem that these and other state interests prevail over the
right to family life, without the latter having been given the proper weight due to it
according to its status as a fundamental constitutional right. In Bornea, the District
Court did not properly consider the grave harm to the best interests of the minor, the
son of the petitioner, which resulted from the negation of her lawful status in Israel,
and which would apparently lead to a severance in the relationship between him and
his father. The ruling that, in the circumstances of the case, the state interest
supersedes the best interests of the child is puzzling, particularly in light of the
principle laid down by the Supreme Court whereby “there is no judicial matter
regarding minors where the best interests of the minor are not the paramount
concern.”122 The Supreme Court has also ruled that the best interests of the child
dictate that he or she be educated equally by both parents and not kept away from the
father or mother, even when they live separately.123 The District Court, therefore, did
not properly weigh the fundamental right to family life, which establishes a child’s
right to grow up with his or her father and mother, as well as the right of parents to
raise their children, as these rights have been recognized in both Israeli and
international law. To the extent that it concerns the right of parents to raise their
children, on more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has laid down the basic
principle whereby this is a fundamental constitutional right: 124
No one disputes that the connection of the parent to his child is not
only a duty but that it is also a right. The nature of this right is that
the parents – and no one else – are entitled to fulfill the duties visà-vis the minor child. The legal right of the parent is that he, and
nobody else, shall fulfill the duties vis-à- vis the child. This right of
the parents is an important constitutional right, for it constitutes an
expression of the natural connection – “the call of blood,” in the
words of Justice Cheshin in CA 50/55, at p. 799 – between parents
and their children.
Furthermore: 125
It is the law of nature that a child be raised in the home of his
father and mother: it is they who will love him, it is they who will
nourish him, it is they who will educate him, it is they who will
support him until he reaches adulthood. This is the right of a father
and a mother, and this is the right of the minor [cite omitted]. This
right of a mother and a father has existed prior to statute and
constitution. The law of nature is the law within our hearts. And
even if these matters are stated in statute or constitution, they are
none other than an echo of that same right from nature. Much
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ground water gives life to this right, and this is what sustains the
forest of law that grows upon it. And the law of the land shall go
in the wake of the law of nature.
The family bond also establishes rights for the child: 126
These rights are also based on the duties of parents vis-à-vis their
children – as expressed in written law – regarding custody,
education, preservation of property, health, etc., as well as rights
granted to a minor by the very fact that he is a minor, i.e., rights
that recognize the state of the minor and his limitations and special
needs … the duties of the parents, as defined in the Legal Capacity
and Guardianship Law, are no longer general obligations, but
rather duties that establish collateral rights for the child.
Noncompliance by parents with the duties they have vis-à-vis their
children will be met with action by the state, as the entity that
protects the child and his interests.
In these cases, the infringement of the parent’s right to a family life with his or her
children constitutes a grave harm, since one of the parents will be forced to sever
himself or herself from the minor child; if the foreign parent is the custodial parent,
then the right of the Israeli parent will be harmed; if the Israeli parent is the custodial
parent, then the right of the foreign parent will be harmed.
These rights are also firmly enshrined in international law.127 Article 9(3) of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child imposes a duty on the member states, inter
alia, to “respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis,
except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.” In a similar fashion, Article 10(1)
of this Convention provides for the child’s right to reunification with his or her
parents and obliges the member states to allow the entry of the child or his or her
parents into the member country for the purpose of realizing this right. Furthermore,
Article 14(2) of the Convention imposes a duty on the member states to respect the
rights of the child and the rights of his or her parents, and Article 18(1) requires the
member states to “use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that
both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the
child.”
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the term “family life” includes
the bond between parents and their minor children, a bond that does not cease in the
event of a separation between the spouses: “From the moment of the child’s birth and
by the very fact of it, there exists between him and his parents a bond amounting to
‘family life,’ even if the parents are not then living together.”128
Moreover, and despite the fact that the European Convention does not apply to the
State of Israel, we should mention several decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights, handed down on the basis of Article 8 of this Convention, the facts of which
126
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are similar to cases that have come before the Israeli courts. From these cases, it is
possible to draw conclusions regarding the proper weight that should be given to the
right to family life. The Berrehab case concerned a Moroccan national married to a
Dutch woman, whose daughter was born in the Netherlands.129 As in the Bornea
case, the father had been given a permit to stay based on his marriage, and when the
couple divorced, the Dutch immigration authorities refused to extend his residence
permit. Subsequently, the father was deported. The European Court based its
decision on the existence of a continuous and permanent bond between the father and
his daughter, ruling that the deportation violated the provisions of the Convention,
and that the separation from the child forced on the parent constitutes a violation of
the “right to family life,” as specified in Article 8 of the European Convention.130 In
a similar fashion, the Ciliz case concerned a Turkish national who had received
permanent status based on his marriage to a Dutch woman, in the Netherlands, with
whom he had a child who was a Dutch national.131 Following the couple’s divorce, it
was decided not to extend the husband’s permit to stay. The petitioner argued that
this decision prevented him from realizing his right to family life, as far as it
concerned the relationship with his son. The European Court accepted his petition
and ruled, inter alia, that: 132
The essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against
arbitrary action by the public authorities. There may in addition be
positive obligations inherent in effective “respect” for family life…
the instant case features both types of obligation: on the one hand,
a positive obligation to ensure that family life between parents and
children can continue after divorce, and, on the other, a negative
obligation to refrain from measures which cause family ties to
rupture.
It would seem that the degree of recognition given to immigration rights based on
family ties between parents and their children is weaker than the degree of
recognition accorded to the immigration rights of a foreign spouse based on marriage.
However, it is not at all obvious why the strength of the bond between a minor and
129
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his or her parent is weaker than the bond between spouses, and it seems only proper
that the former right be accorded protection in the same manner and to the same
degree as the latter right. 133 Since the Ministry of Interior and the courts in Israel
have determined that the marital bond mandates the granting of a residential status in
Israel to a foreign spouse who is in a marital relationship with an Israeli citizen, there
is no justification for a policy negating such status when the bond is parental. In this
context, it is appropriate to adopt the arrangement laid down by international law,
whereby, in the case of a separation between a couple with common children, when
one spouse is not a citizen, the state – as part of its commitment to protect the bond
between parent and child – undertakes to refrain from deporting the foreign parent
and to grant him or her lawful status.

IV. The Right to Civil Marriage in Israeli Law in View of International Law
A. The Right to Marriage and its Limitation
The right – or the “freedom” – to marry and to establish a family is a fundamental
right of the highest order that has been recognized as a basic human right under
international law. Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides, inter alia, that: “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.” Article
23(2) of the Covenant on Civil Rights states that: “The right of men and women of
marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.” Article 10(1)
of the Covenant on Social Rights reiterates that stated in Article 23(3) of the
Covenant on Civil Rights, whereby “… [m]arriage must be entered into with the free
consent of the intending spouses.” A combined reading of the provisions of these
instruments reveals the centrality of the right to marriage in the context of the right to
family life. In the spirit of these documents, the State of Israel, like most western
nations, also grants the highest degree of protection and recognition to the traditional
nuclear family, that which is based on the heterosexual married couple and their
children. In this context, it should be stressed that the issue of the right to marry also
has far-reaching economic implications (e.g., tax benefits, national insurance rights,
pension rights, etc.); furthermore, the provision or preclusion of economic benefits is
a central means at the disposal of the state to direct individuals towards existing
family models preferred by society. By granting a preferential status to the institution
of marriage over other types of partnerships, the state expresses its position that the
heterosexual relationship based on marriage embodies the normative family unit
deserving of various state benefits. However, even within this narrow framework,
the state imposes various limitations on the right to marry.
In most western countries, as in the State of Israel, several explicit limitations on the
right to marry are accepted as a matter of public policy. Three such limitations relate
to the following: a minimum age for marriage; family relations between the spouses
(a prohibition against incestuous marriages on grounds of both consanguinity and
affinity); and the existence of a previous marriage (a prohibition of bigamy and
polygamy). An additional prohibition relates to the sex of the spouses, i.e., a
133
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prohibition of marriage between same-sex partners. We will discuss each one of
these limitations, respectively.134
Minimum Age for Marriage: Even though the specific age varies from country to
country, a limitation on the age for marriage is accepted in most western nations and
is based, inter alia, on the notion that “the creation of a family unit with a formal,
binding relationship requires personal maturity, and, in a civilized society, one waits
for the development of the personality – i.e., attributes of mind and body – before
permitting marriage.”135 This limitation finds expression both in Article 16(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that “[m]en and women of
full age … have the right to marry and to found a family” (emphasis added), and in
Article 23(2) of the Covenant on Civil Rights, which states that the right to marry
shall be granted to “men and women of marriageable age.” In a similar fashion,
Article 16(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women provides that “… all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to
specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an
official registry compulsory.” The rationale behind these provisions is that the free
consent of the marrying couple is a prerequisite for marriage, and that it is necessary
to lay down a minimum age in order to ensure that this consent is, in fact, given
freely. Another reason is the need to guarantee stable married life and the view that
such stability can only be guaranteed if the two spouses are mature enough to be fully
aware of their obligations within the family context. The aforesaid conventions do
not specify the minimum age required, and this is with the understanding that each
state will give substance to its obligation to set a minimum age for marriage in
accordance with the accepted values of its own society.136
The principle of a minimum age for marriage is also enshrined in a special
international convention designed for this specific purpose, which Israel has signed:
the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and
Registration of Marriages. This Convention reiterates the principle expressed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and states, in Article 2, that: 137
States Parties to the present Convention shall take legislative
action to specify a minimum age for marriage. No marriage shall
be legally entered into by any person under this age, except where
a competent authority has granted a dispensation as to age, for
serious reasons, in the interest of the intending spouses.
In the State of Israel, this matter is regulated by the Marriage Age Law, 1950. Up
until 1998, this statute specified the age of 17 as the minimum age of marriage for
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women.138 For men, however, no minimum age of marriage was specified. In order
to address this disparity, the statute was amended so that its provisions limiting the
marriage of young girls were applied equally to the marriage of young boys under the
age of 17, out of the understanding that “the prevention of underage marriages is
necessary for young boys to the same extent that it is required for young girls.”139
According to the amended statute, the performance of a marriage ceremony for a
young boy or girl under the age of 17 constitutes a criminal offense punishable by
two years imprisonment. The statute does not annul the validity of underage
marriages but rather imposes criminal sanctions on the man or woman who marries
the young girl or boy, on those persons who perform the ceremony and on anyone
who assists them.140 Nevertheless, Section 5 of the statute specifies two alternative
grounds for a court to permit an underage marriage. The first case arises in
circumstances in which the young girl has become pregnant by or has given birth to
the child of the person she is asking to marry, or, in the case of a young boy, when
the woman who he wants to marry has become pregnant or has given birth to his
child. The second case, which also applies both to the marriage of a young boy and
the marriage of a young girl, is when they have reached the age of 16 and, in the
court’s opinion, there are special circumstances that justify granting such permission
– however, the statute does not specify exactly what these “special circumstances”
are.141 The Israeli Report to the UN Committee regarding the implementation of the
Covenant on Social Rights indicates that, in actuality, while the percentage of
marriages between young girls under the age of 17 and adult men averaged about
48% between the years 1975-1979, in 1993 this number stood at about 10%;
nevertheless, the marriage of minors in the State of Israel is still an ongoing
phenomenon – albeit, on the decline – in spite of the Marriage Age Law and the
criminal sanctions imposed therein.142
Prohibition against incestuous marriages on grounds of consanguinity and
affinity: Regarding the prohibition of marriage between persons related by blood or
marriage, it is the applicable religious law that specifies the degrees of relation
included in the prohibition.143 Nevertheless, the prohibition is not limited to religious
law and should not be viewed only as a religious norm, since it is accepted in all
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civilized societies and has rational justifications that suffice on their own.144 Thus,
for instance, one of the explanations for this prohibition is genetic, i.e., the fear that
children born to people who are related by blood are liable to be afflicted with
various genetic defects.145 Of course, the genetic fear does not justify prohibitions
based on relations by marriage and, in this matter, it seems that the rationale stems
from psychological and sociological considerations.146
Prohibition of Bigamy: The prohibition against multiple marriages is designed to
uproot customs accepted in traditional societies that harm the status of women.147 If
we accept the definition of the institution of marriage as a permanent, exclusive
relationship between two spouses, not only does this restriction do no harm to the
right to family life, but it even reinforces the right.148 Section 176 of the Penal Law
specifies bigamy as a criminal offense, whereby: “A married man who marries
another woman, or a married woman who marries another man, is liable to
imprisonment for five years.” Since matters of marriage and divorce in Israel are
governed by religious law, the legislature cannot declare bigamous marriages as void
when such marriages are recognized by the relevant religious law (such as in a case
where permission has been granted by a Rabbinical Court for the second marriage of
a Jewish man), however, the legislature does take steps to eliminate the phenomenon
by means of criminal sanctions.149 Accordingly, Section 179 of the Penal Law states
that the criminal prohibition does not apply to the extent that it relates to the second
marriage of a Jew that has been performed after the husband had received permission
to remarry from a Rabbinical Court (an option not available to a woman who is an
agunah; literally translated as a “chained woman,” in Jewish Law, this Hebrew term
refers to a woman bound in marriage by a husband who refuses to grant a divorce or
who is missing and not proved dead); regarding persons who are not Jewish, Section
180 of the Penal Law provides that a second marriage shall not be deemed a violation
of the prohibition of bigamy if the spouse by the earlier marriage is mentally ill or has
been missing for a period of seven years under circumstances raising a reasonable
presumption of death.
Prohibition of Marriage between Same-Sex Partners: Up until recently, the
institution of marriage has been defined and perceived of as being limited to the
relationship between a man and a woman, without there having been any need for
explicit legislation prohibiting same-sex marriages. In the past, it was even argued
that this was not to be viewed as a restriction on the freedom to marry, since by its
very definition, marriage was limited to partners of different sexes.150 So far, the
only countries that have recognized same-sex marriages are the Netherlands,
Belgium, Canada (in Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec), and one US state
(Massachusetts), and in other countries throughout the world there is an ongoing
legal and public struggle for such recognition. Many countries recognize same-sex
couples as a family and, in differing measures, extend various provisions to them that
144
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apply to married couples.151 The right to family life is not the exclusive domain of
heterosexual society. Many gays and lesbians conduct a family life for all intents and
purposes. Alongside the limited recognition granted by the Israeli Supreme Court to
same-sex partnerships and the right to parenthood of gays and lesbians,152 the case
law of the Family Court and the District Court negates such recognition.153 While
restrictions as to the age for marriage, polygamous marriages and marriages between
relatives are rational and desirable, the restriction of marriage to heterosexual
partnerships is unjustified and results from prejudice against gays and lesbians.
Nevertheless, it seems that as long as religious law exclusively governs matters of
marriage and divorce in Israel, the legislature cannot be expected to recognize the
rights of gays and lesbians to marry. However, if and when the barriers to civil
marriage are removed, as mandated by the international conventions that Israel has
signed – so I will argue below – then their restriction to heterosexual relationships
may be considered illegitimate discrimination that violates the principle of equality.
In addition to the first three limitations on the right to marriage discussed above (a
minimum age, the prohibition of the marriage of relatives and the prohibition of
bigamy) – restrictions, which, as stated, are accepted in all western nations and
perceived of as legitimate in all civilized societies, and which are not to be viewed of
as religious coercion – there are several additional limitations on the right to marry
that are specific to the State of Israel. Not only is the right to marriage not applied
equally to all residents of the country, but there is also an inherent discrimination
between men and women in the laws of marriage and divorce in Israel. These
limitations stem from the application of religious law to matters of marriage and
divorce and from the lack of civil marriage. In contrast to the Israeli legal situation,
in most western nations, the transition from religious law to the regulation of
marriage as a secular civil right had already begun in the 18th and 19th centuries, with
the end of the church’s monopolistic jurisdiction and the introduction of civil
marriage.154 Israel is one of the only democratic countries in the world where
personal law is still exclusively governed by religious law.155 Section 2 of the
Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953 (hereinafter:
“Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law”) provides that: “Marriages and divorces of
Jews shall be performed in Israel in accordance with Jewish religious law.”156 The
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application of religious law to matters of marriage and divorce for Jews in Israel, and
the lack of an option to marry in a civil marriage ceremony, constitutes a serious
infringement of the right to family life, in general, and of the right to marriage, in
particular. This infringement is further aggravated by the exclusive jurisdiction of
the religious courts in matters of marriage and divorce – institutions that completely
exclude women. The absence of an option for civil marriage harms three main
groups: first and foremost, the application of religious law to matters of marriage and
divorce constitutes a violation of the principle of equality between the sexes, since
many religious laws discriminate against women; secondly, the lack of a civil
arrangement for marriage also harms those persons who are unable to marry
according to religious law (such as those persons who have no religion); thirdly, the
religious monopoly also harms the freedom from religion of all those couples who do
not want religious law to apply to their marriages.

B.

The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Israel: Discrimination against
Women and Additional Groups

1. Discrimination Against Women
Religious law – all religious law – is based on a patriarchal viewpoint and
tradition,157 and, as such, discriminates against women. This discrimination is
apparent, inter alia, in the subordination of women to the authority of men, in an
unequal division of roles within the family, and in the perception that women possess
a very limited social and personal status.158 Moreover, for Jews in Israel, the
religious law that governs in matters of personal status is the law as interpreted by
Orthodox Judaism, which leaves no room for a more lenient interpretation that is
inclined to greater equality between the sexes, such as that of the Conservative or
Reform Movements.159
To the extent that it relates to the inequality between the sexes within the context of
the laws of marriage and divorce, the Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951 has merely
declarative significance. Indeed, the purpose of this statute is “to lay down principles
for the guarantee of full equality between men and women,”160 and, indeed, the
statute provides that “one law shall apply to men and women regarding any legal act;
and any statutory provision that discriminates against a woman, as a woman,
regarding any legal act, shall not be binding”161 – however, the reservation in
Section 5, whereby the statute “shall not affect any legal prohibition or permission
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relating to marriage or divorce,” in effect, renders it meaningless and actually
reinforces the discrimination against women prevailing in religious law.162
The laws of marriage and divorce regulate three different areas: (a) the manner of
entering into a marriage, from the perspective of form and capacity; (b) the system of
rights and duties constituting the substance of a marriage; (c) the manner in which a
marriage is dissolved.163 In all three areas, provisions of Jewish religious law may be
found that are discriminatory against women.164 It suffices to give several examples
from the field of divorce law applying to Jews in Israel, although similar problems
also exist according to the religious law applying to other population groups in Israel
(Christians, Muslims, etc.). Discrimination against women in divorce law is
expressed, primarily, in the fact that the grounds for divorce available to them are
different and fewer than those available to men. A ground of action sufficient to
obligate a wife to accept a get [the “writ of divorce”], does not necessarily suffice to
force the husband to deliver a get.165 This results in an asymmetry, between the
husband and the wife, in the grounds for obligating and compelling the delivery of a
get, something that acts to the detriment of the wife. It should be further noted that
the Rabbinical Courts are very reluctant to coerce a husband to deliver a get.
Likewise, without having received a get from her husband, a woman is unable to
obtain permission to remarry, whereas, in contrast, a husband is entitled to remarry
by special permission of the Rabbinical Court.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has censured this
discriminatory practice, stating that: 166
The Committee expresses concern about the fact that the Jewish
religious courts’ interpretation of personal law with respect to
divorce is discriminatory to women, especially the regulation that
allows the husband to re-marry even when the wife is opposed to
the divorce, whilst the same rules do not apply to the wife…. The
Committee recommends that the State party undertake steps to
modify the Jewish religious courts’ interpretation of the law
concerning divorce to ensure equality between men and women, as
provided for in Article 3 of the Covenant.
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Therefore, in contrast to men, women are “sentenced” to monogamy, since,
according to Jewish Law, adultery is only forbidden to women (in the sense that a
married woman, who has not received a get from her husband, is considered an
adulteress if she has relations with another man). This monogamy is imposed upon
her all the more forcefully by the rule providing that any child born to her from a man
who is not her husband will be considered a mamzer [the offspring of a forbidden
union].167 Therefore, frequently, the option of a life as the reputed spouse of another
man is also closed off to her, if she has not received a get from her husband. In
contrast, the husband is not exposed to any sanction if he lives with another woman
as his reputed spouse. Moreover, the relative bargaining power of the wife is inferior
to that of the husband.168 The problem of aginut [the wife’s status as an agunah]
leads to a situation in which the woman is sometimes willing to make significant
economic concessions in order to be released from an extortionist spouse.169 Matters
are further complicated by what is known as the “jurisdictional race,” i.e., the race
between the spouses to file suit first in the instance he or she prefers, either the
religious court or the Family Court (generally, women prefer the Family Courts,
while men prefer the Rabbinical Courts); this race is detrimental to the bargaining
power of the parties, especially that of the economically weaker party, which, in most
cases, is the wife.170
Further discrimination is reflected in the property arrangements between the spouses
prior to the divorce. On the subject of maintenance, despite the fact that the law
applying in both the religious court and the Family Court is the same law – the
personal law of the parties171 – studies by the National Insurance Institute indicate
that the level of maintenance payments in judgments by the Rabbinical Courts is 30%
lower than that in those handed down by the civil courts.172
The situation is no better concerning the division of property between separating
spouses who have not made a property agreement. According to the resourcesbalancing arrangement laid down in the Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 1973,
resources balancing only takes place upon the dissolution of the marriage as a result
of a divorce or the death of one spouse. This arrangement leads to a problematic
situation potentially more harmful to women than to men, because women who are
denied a get are unable to benefit from a resources-balancing arrangement, even
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when the marriage has been effectively over for many years. The later the resources
balancing takes place, the greater the bargaining power of the husband.173
2. Discrimination against Additional Groups
In addition to the discrimination against women resulting from the application of
religious law in matters of marriage and divorce, several other groups are also
discriminated against, since the exclusive application of religious law leads to a
situation in which persons belonging to these groups are completely unable to get
married in the State of Israel. The groups that are harmed include, first of all, those
persons without a religion and those persons whose religious community is not
recognized.174 Secondly, Israeli law does not permit mixed marriages, i.e., marriages
between members of different religious communities (except for those isolated cases
in which the personal law of both parties recognizes such marriages175). Under
Jewish Law, a marriage between a Jew and a non-Jew is void ab initio.176 The third
group includes persons disqualified for religious marriage: even when both spouses
are Jewish, there are various prohibitions in religious law that limit their right to
marry. Such couples are “disqualified for marriage” because they are unable to
marry according to the laws of the State of Israel. The impediments to marriage may
be classified into three categories, according to their consequences177: (a) marriages
that are void ab initio: including, inter alia, the second marriage of a woman still
considered to be married to her previous husband and incestuous relationships178; (b)
doubtful marriages: cases in which there is a question as to the validity of the
marriage, and because of this doubt (which may arise, for example, in a case of a
private marriage or a civil marriage that has been performed abroad) the wife requires
a get in order to remarry179; (c) prohibited marriages that are retroactively valid: this
173
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category (which results in the couple being forced to divorce one another) includes,
inter alia, the prohibition against the marriage of a Kohen [a descendant of the
ancient priestly caste] to a divorced woman, to a chalutzah [a widow released from a
levirate marriage] or to a convert.180 These groups include about a quarter of a
million immigrants from the CIS (the former Soviet Union) and many Ethiopian
immigrants, who are not Jewish or whose Jewishness is questioned by the religious
establishment; they, too, are unable to realize their right to marry and to establish a
family in Israel.181
These restrictions are just an example of the many limitations imposed by religious
law, in general, and by Jewish Law, in particular. These and other restrictions cause
grave harm to the freedom of the couple to marry and to establish a family. The
solutions that exist in order to circumvent these prohibitions are limited and partial.182
In addition to the discrimination against women and other groups that results from
the restrictions imposed by religious law, its application in matters of marriage and
divorce also does harm to the freedom from religion of those Israeli citizens who do
not want religious law to govern their personal status. The imposition of religious
restrictions that entail the jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts and the application of
religious law in matters of marriage and divorce is incompatible with freedom of
conscience and freedom from religion.183 Freedom of conscience and religion dictate
that the individual has the legal and practical option to realize his or her rights –
including the right to marriage – without being compelled to rely on religious norms,
religious ceremonies and religious authorities.184

C. The Freedom to Marry without Discrimination – International Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil Rights and the
Covenant on Social Rights all recognize the right to marry as a fundamental right.185
Moreover, these three instruments lay down the principle of equality of rights
between the sexes within the context of the institution of marriage, in the three areas
discussed above: the creation of the marriage, the duties and rights during married life
and the dissolution of the marriage. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides, at the end of Article 16(1), that the spouses “are entitled to equal rights as to
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.” The Covenant on Civil Rights also
provides for equality of rights within the context of marriage; according to Article
180
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23(4) of the Covenant, “States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate
steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during
marriage and at its dissolution.” In the Covenant on Social Rights, the requirement of
equality of rights between the spouses arises both from Article 2(2), which provides
that the rights enunciated in the Covenant be exercised without discrimination of any
kind, including discrimination on the basis of sex, and from Article 3, which states the
principle of equality between the sexes as follows: “The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of
all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.” Another
convention that also provides for equality of rights between the sexes within the
context of the institution of marriage is the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women. Article 16(1) of this Convention provides as
follows:186
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into
marriage only with their free and full consent;
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at
its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective
of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all
cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable them to exercise
these rights;
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to
guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children,
or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national
legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be
paramount;
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including
the right to choose a family name, a profession and an
occupation;
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the
ownership,
acquisition,
management,
administration,
enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge
or for a valuable consideration.
In addition to the explicit prohibition of discrimination between the sexes within the
context of marriage, these three instruments also provide for the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of national origin, race and religion: Article 2(2) of the
Covenant on Social Rights specifies an open list of prohibitions against
186
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discrimination (“or other status”); Articles 2(1) and 26 of the Covenant on Civil
Rights lay down a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national
origin “or other status”; and Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that the right to marry shall not be limited “due to race, nationality or
religion.”
These conventions do not define the nature of the marriage ceremony that is the
subject of the right or the nature of the law that applies to marriage. In fact, in the
wording of the international conventions, we did not find an explicit requirement for
the implementation of civil marriage. Nevertheless, since these conventions forbid
discrimination on the basis of sex, national origin, race and religion in the
implementation of the right to marriage, they should be interpreted as indirectly
forbidding the exclusive application of religious law in matters of marriage and
divorce. In the General Comment of the Committee on Human Rights of 1990, the
Committee expressly noted that “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion implies that the legislation of each State should provide for the possibility of
both religious and civil marriages” (emphasis added).187 If that is the case, then the
implementation of the provisions of the conventions necessitates the grant of a right
to marriage without discrimination of any kind whatsoever.188 Therefore, the word
“marriage” in the aforesaid conventions should be interpreted as referring to civil
marriage.

D. The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Israel in View of International Law
The laws of marriage and divorce in the State of Israel are incompatible with the
fundamental human right to marry and to establish a family as recognized and
accepted in the international sphere.189 Israeli law in matters of marriage and
divorce, therefore, gravely harms the possibility for many people to fully realize their
right to family life. This law leads to an inequality in the legal status of men and
women, and imposes arbitrary restrictions on various groups in the population,
discriminating against them on the basis of religion, national origin and race.
The ways in which the State of Israel restricts the right to marriage and infringes on it
by applying religious law, as mentioned, are as follows: (a) negation of the right to
marry for persons without a religion and members of unrecognized religious
communities; (b) restriction of the possibility for mixed marriages between spouses
of different religions; (c) restriction of the right to marry for persons disqualified for
religious marriage; and (d) a violation of the equality between women and men
within the context of the institution of marriage.
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The question, therefore, is to what degree is Israel in breach of the provisions of
Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 2(1) and 26 of
the Covenant on Civil Rights, and Article 2(2) of the Covenant on Social Rights – to
the extent that it concerns the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
national origin, race and religion; and the provisions of Article 16(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(4) of the Covenant on Civil
Rights, Articles 2(2) and 3 of the Covenant on Social Rights, and Article 16(1) of the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – to the extent that
it concerns the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. Regarding
Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it had been argued that
Israel is in breach of this provision only in those cases where the right to marry has
been completely denied to certain groups (persons without a religion and members of
unrecognized religious communities), i.e., it was claimed that the prohibition of
discrimination should only attach to the subjects of the right – men and women – and
not to the right itself.190 This interpretation is unacceptable, since it is incompatible
with the wording of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is
liable to render the provision meaningless.191 As for Article 16(1) of the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and Article 23 of the Covenant
on Civil Rights, the State of Israel has given notice that it has reservations regarding
these provisions, insofar as it concerns their incompatibility with the personal law
binding upon the religious communities in Israel. These reservations run contrary to
the subject matter and purpose of the conventions – the prevention of discrimination
against women, even under the laws of personal status.192 Undoubtedly, in view of
the aforesaid international instruments, any kind of discrimination in granting the
right to marriage – on the basis of race, national origin, ethnicity, religion and sex – is
a breach of international commitments by the State of Israel. Therefore, it is not only
the denial of the right to certain groups that constitutes a breach of the conventions
that Israel has signed, but also its restriction for religious reasons, like the
arrangements that discriminate against women in the context of the institution of
marriage – all of these constitute illegitimate discrimination that gravely harms the
individual’s right to marry.193 The aforesaid international instruments also provide
for the right of equality between the spouses, not only in the creation of the marriage,
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but also in its dissolution; therefore, the right to freely marry (freedom from the
restrictions of religious law, in other words, the right to civil marriage) also includes
the right to civil divorce.
The conclusion is that the State of Israel is in breach of both the prohibition against
discrimination between men and women, as well as prohibitions against
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin and religion, during all three
stages of marriage: its creation, its content and its dissolution. As stated, the right to
marriage under international law should be interpreted as referring to the
implementation of civil marriage. It is true that many countries that have signed
these conventions recognize marriages that have been performed according to
religious law, however, except for Israel, all western nations that have signed the
conventions grant such recognition alongside and in addition to the option of civil
marriage. Moreover, the law that governs in these countries, both during the
marriage and for the purpose of its dissolution, is the civil law. Accordingly, there is,
in fact, nothing illegitimate in the recognition of religious marriage as an additional
way to form the marital bond, provided that the state (also) grants its citizens the right
to civil marriage.
Ostensibly, it could be argued that the right to civil marriage, like other rights
enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights, is not an absolute but rather a relative
right, since Article 4 of this Covenant provides that the member states are entitled to
limit the rights enunciated therein by law “in so far as this may be compatible with
the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare
in a democratic society.” Therefore, prima facie, the State of Israel could claim that,
by implementing marriage according to religious law, it is limiting the right to civil
marriage lawfully and in accordance with the Covenant. Such a claim would be
untenable, for several reasons. Firstly, the relativity of the rights is expressed in their
cost, and the principle of equality between the sexes is not diminished because of the
relativity of the right. That is to say, the responsibility of the member states to
implement the rights is dependent on the amount of resources at their disposal194 –
which, as stated, has no relevance concerning the nature of marriage. Secondly, the
Committee for the Implementation of the Covenant on Social Rights has interpreted
Article 4 very narrowly.195 Thirdly, even if such a claim was accepted, then, as
stated, the right to civil marriage arises from several other conventions that Israel has
signed (the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women196).
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Being well aware of the cultural, economic and social differences between various
nations, both the Covenant on Social Rights and the Covenant on Civil Rights set
forth minimum standards of respect for human rights binding upon the states that
have signed these conventions.197 International law, therefore, tries to achieve a
consensus in regard to such a minimum standard for the recognition of basic social
and civil rights, as reflected in the conventions regulating these matters.198 These
conventions specify the lowest threshold for the degree of protection required of the
states in the socio-political realm. Of course, the member states should aspire to the
widest possible protection in these areas, but the states are not entitled to settle for
less protection than that specified in the conventions. The lowest threshold, or the
“minimum core”,199 of the right to family life is the right to freely marry, and if we
interpret “marriage” as “civil marriage,” as I have proposed, then a state that does not
grant its citizens the freedom to marry in a civil ceremony is in breach of the
provisions of the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Covenant on Social Rights, as
well as the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women. As to the pace and time for implementing the rights enunciated in the
conventions, it is customary to differentiate between the Covenant on Civil Rights
and the Covenant on Social Rights, since the former imposes obligations on the state
that must be fulfilled immediately, while the latter sets standards that the state must
aspire to realize, and whereas for some of the rights – those rights the implementation
of which entails an investment of resources – the pace of implementation may be
progressive. However, where it is possible to grant the right without a need for
resources – even when it is enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights – it must be
granted immediately.200 Various aspects of the right to family life require the
allocation of resources, such as the right of the family to social security and means of
subsistence, while others, such as the right to be a parent (in its negative sense), do
not impose any economic burden on the state. As stated, the right to marriage is both
a civil and a social right, and a change in its manner of implementation (replacing
religious marriage with civil marriage, or introducing civil marriage alongside
religious marriage) does not necessitate an investment of resources. Accordingly, for
this right, there is no reason to apply the progressive principle specified by the
Covenant on Social Rights, and it should be dealt with as mandated by the Covenant
on Civil Rights: by the absolute and immediate adoption of the measures necessary
for its implementation.
A different question is whether there is a need for a legislative reform or whether an
Israeli court has the authority to invalidate the current arrangement regarding matters
of marriage and divorce. First of all, the right to freely marry in the State of Israel
should be recognized as a part of the right to “human dignity and liberty” enshrined
in the Basic Law of the same name. In the words of Prof. Rubinstein: “From the
197

B.B. von Maydell, “The Impact of the EEC on Labor Law,” 68 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1401, 1404
(1993); J.J. Paust, “Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality,” 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 12
(2001).
198
J. Crawford, “Democracy and the Body of International Law,” Democratic Governance and
International Law (New-York, G.H. Fox & B.R. Roth eds., 2000) 91, 91-92.
199
Shany, supra note 194.
200
See Craven, supra note 38, at 136; General Comment No. 3 of 1990, the Committee for
Implementation of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that there is an
immediate obligation to adopt measures the implementation of which does not entail significant
financial cost; see G.C. 3, supra note 41; Shany, id.

48

perspective of the values of the state as a democratic country, it is hard to see what
proper purpose is served by forcing the Jewish citizens of the state to be subject to
Jewish Law in matters of marriage and divorce.”201 Nevertheless, in this context, it is
not necessary to resolve the conflict between the values of the State of Israel as a
democratic country and its values as a Jewish state, since the “validity of laws”
provision in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty precludes Section 1 of the
Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law from being declared unconstitutional. Moreover,
on more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has ruled that the solution of the
problem of the right to marriage in the State of Israel is out of its hands: 202
It is obvious to anyone who follows the Knesset’s work and the
positions of the various political parties that this issue is a major
bone of contention among the Israeli public, and that there has not
yet been a decision, with proper legal form, to introduce civil
marriage. And who are we, as judges ordered to distance ourselves
from all political debate and argument, to take the place of the
legislature and to decide on a question that divides the public?
Furthermore: 203
With all due respect to the struggle of the Petitioners and those
groups that think like them regarding their right to marry in a nonreligious context, their claim should be addressed to the proper
[authority] – the legislature. There is no solution for their problem
other than by means of civil marriage performed by the state
without any consideration for the religious affiliation (or lack
thereof) of the parties. The courts should not be asked to resolve
this problem.
In Efrat, Justice Barak, has ruled that: 204
In Israeli society, there is no consensus on this issue, and the Court
cannot be expected to decide pronouncedly one way or the other.
The Court crystallizes public policy as it is reflected, from its own
objective perspective. Unequivocal decisions in this sensitive
matter can only come from non-judicial entities. There are those
who believe that the solution to the problem is the introduction of
civil marriage … others believe that the solution is to be found in
the field of Jewish law itself … in any event, the Court itself
cannot and should not resolve the basic problem. The Court
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should not be expected to order the introduction of civil marriage,
and the Court has consistently refused to do so.
In view of these rulings, it would seem that the demand for the introduction of civil
marriage in the State of Israel should be directed at the legislature.205 However, it is
highly doubtful that in the current Israeli political framework the legislature will be
inclined to provide a comprehensive arrangement for civil marriage. At present, the
apparent trend is a compromise whereby a quasi-marriage institution (a “partnership
registry”) will be introduced that will only solve the problem of persons disqualified
for religious marriage in Israel.

V. Conclusion
International law recognizes the right to family life as a fundamental right of
paramount importance. The courts in Israel have also recognized the right to family
life as a fundamental constitutional right. However, as we have seen, in various
contexts, proper weight has not been given to this basic right. The absence of a clear,
standard definition for the “family” and the exclusion of “alternative” family bonds
leads to an infringement of the rights of many who, in practice, conduct a family life.
Thus, for instance, only married heterosexual couples are entitled to adopt a foreign
child together and only a man and a woman who are a couple are entitled to use the
services of a surrogate mother – as a result, the right to parenthood of unmarried
couples (or couples who are not reputed spouses), including that of same-sex couples,
is limited. Moreover, we have found a disparity in the manner of implementation of
the right to family life between Jewish Israeli citizens, on the one hand, and Arab
Israeli citizens and Arab residents of the Occupied Territories, on the other hand.
This discrimination is primarily expressed in regard to the right to immigrate to the
State of Israel based on family ties and the right of residents of the Occupied
Territories to “family unification.”
The most severe limitation on the right to family life within the borders of the State
of Israel relates to the lack of an option to marry in a civil ceremony. While
international law recognizes the imposition of certain limitations on the freedom to
marry (the age for marriage, prohibitions regarding incest and bigamy), the additional
limitations on the right to marry, imposed by Israeli law, constitute a breach of
international commitments by the State of Israel.
Making the right to marriage conditional on compliance with the requirements of a
substantive religious law that does not recognize the marriages of persons without a
religion, marriages between members of different religious communities, and even
certain cases of marriage between members of the same religion, and which further
lays down precepts that discriminate against women, is undoubtedly a violation of the
provisions of the international conventions and instruments discussed in this article.
The only way to ensure equality within the family context in Israel, and by so doing
to guarantee the right of every person to marriage free of the fetters of religious law,
is by legislative reform that would permit civil marriage. The proper arrangement
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would specify civil law as the exclusive substantive law applying in matters of
marriage and divorce, and would allow a choice between a civil marriage ceremony
and a religious marriage ceremony.
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